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This thesis attempts to define the decision space of
Egyptian military leaders and to provide a tool for pre-
dicting future Egyptian military attitudes and decisions.
The methodology used is the operational code construct
developed by Alexander George and others. The research
proceeded on two levels: 1) an analysis of the decision-
making process of Egyptian military leaders, and 2) an
analysis of the operational code as a vehicle for predicting
decision-making processes of political groups. Egyptian
military leaders were the focus of the study because of
their vital role in Middle Eastern affairs. Egypt, by virtue
of its population and industrialization, leads the Arab world.
The Egyptian military is both the dominant factor in Egyptian
politics and the training ground for political leaders. One
hundred six speeches and interviews between 1955 and 1975
provided the data for constructing the code.
Findings: 1) The Egyptian military elite has a common
approach to decision making borne of common experience and
common social background. 2) The Egyptian military sees
the political universe in perpetual conflict. They will
continue to feel that the only answer is strong and decisive
action at the correct historical moment. 3) The operational
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis has been written in the belief that the
Egyptian military is one of the most important variables in
the Middle East equation. When Gamal Abdul Nasir came to
power in 1952, it was the first time in 2500 years that an
Egyptian had ruled Egypt. (118:423) In addition, the Egyptian
regime has become a symbol to the rest of the Arab world
through its continuity. In the middle third of the 20th
century, there have been 35 coups in the Middle East, 15
between 1958 and 1963. (118:245) Since 1952, Egypt has had
none. This continuity, combined with Nasir' s refusal to be
dominated by the western powers, has kept Egypt the leader
of an Arab world tired of chaos and exploitation. (155:180)
As examples of this leadership, Egypt has led the Arab world
to war in 1967 and 1973, and to the negotiating table for
the Sinai Accords in 1975.
Within Egypt the military's authority has been, and
continues to be, almost unquestioned. Nasir stated in his
Philosophy of the Revolution , "The state of affairs singled
out the armed forces as the force to do the job. The situa-
tion demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive
framework, far removed from the conflict between individuals
and classes, and drawn from the heart of the people." (146:42)
The influence of the military has continued since that time.
During the eight Nasir cabinets, the percentage of officers

in each cabinet fluctuated between 32% and 47%. Between
1952 and 1967 only one civilian held one of the four top
posts. (151:112) Amos Perlmutter has stated that, "The
survival of a Nasirite type regime after Nasir will probably
continue to depend on the amount of support the Praetorian
rulers receive from a small number of politically isolated
elites, particularly the armed forces." (149:3) He also
states that the regime of Sadat is entirely dependent on
the military. (149:112)
The military's influence in Egypt and throughout the
Arab world has been evident since 1952. Manfred Halpern has
stated, "It was the Egyptian army coup of 1952 that marked
the beginning of the end for traditional army regimes in
the Arab world." (131:254) Nasir 's decision to break with
the west and buy arms from Russia was spurred by a desire
to satisfy his military. This move broke the monopoly of
western arms throughout the area. (136:129) One of the
primary reasons for the 1967 war was the insistence by Field
Marshal Amer and Air Force commander Fawzi that Nasir attack
before Israel was mobilized. (108:56) In 1971 Sadat was
forced to go to his military for support against the Ali
Sabri coup attempt. (149:193) The ultimatum submitted by
General Sadiq concerning the need to reduce Soviet influence
was the deciding factor in Sadat's expulsion of Soviet
advisors. (149:226) Military pressure to reactivate the
Suez front was a major factor in Sadat's decision to go to
war in 1973. (110:5) In 1974 a delegation of Army officers

expressed concern to Sadat over the condition of the army.
It is believed that this was the chief factor in Sadat's
search for arms, first in the rapprochement with Russia,
and then with overtures to the west. (113:1) Although in
retrospect some might feel that Nasir at one point achieved
control of his military, an incident in 1961 indicates
otherwise. In that year President Nasir decided that Field
Marshal Amer, Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War, had
become too powerful. Through a complicated series of politi-
cal moves, he attempted to strip Amer of his power. The
reaction within the military was so great that he had to
reinstate him to avoid a coup. (151:360)
As the military influence seems obvious and the situa-
tion in the Middle East continues to be explosive, it
becomes increasingly vital for U.S. decision makers to
understand Egyptian decision makers. To dispose of an
inquiry of this type by assuming that Egyptian officers
make decisions based only on either their Arab heritage or
the attitudes common to all military elites would be a
tragic mistake. Therefore, this thesis attempts to con-
struct the decision space of Egyptian military elites by
analysis of their own speeches and interviews.
This thesis is divided into eight parts. Part I is the
introduction. Part II is a statement of the problem in
terms of: 1) the conflicting opinions about Egyptian
military leaders today and 2) the utility of the type of
information presented in the operational code. Part III

presents the behavioral variables that influence the code.
They are: 1) the Arab mentality; 2) common characteristics
of all military regimes; 3) characteristics common to all
Arab regimes; 4) the status of military elites as a class
in Egyptian society. Part IV is a historical review of
the Egyptian military in terms of how this historical
experience affects the military's operational code. The
historical analysis is divided into four time periods:
1955-61, 1961-67, 1967-73, 1973-75. The division of the
historical background into these periods performs a dual
purpose. Firstly, if the operational code is to be a useful
instrument for prediction, it must be assessed in the light
of past historical experience. Secondly, each of these
periods forms a distinct and separate experience for the
military. Consequently, as a starting point the researcher
can look for changes in the code from one period to the
next. A change in decision-making patterns between periods
is significant. However, the absence of change is also
significant. Part V maps out the methodology and data used.
Part VI is the operational code itself, Part VII is the
summary. Part VIII is the conclusion, including predictions




II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem in analyzing an elite, or a group of elites,
is the low utility of current information. Most published
biographies give education, positions held, and at best a
short statement of the elite's personality. There is no
clue to how the leader makes decisions, what his motivations
are, or what environmental factors will bear on his percep-
tion of a problem. There is also a variety of studies on
elites, and specifically Arab elites. However, they have
severe shortcomings for the policy analyst. First, the
information is second hand. The conclusions of the author
are usually based on either a broad historical analysis or
a sociological study of the culture. Although these studies
are useful, and are used in this study as background material,
they are much too broad to base a decision on. In addition,
experts disagree on the results of their studies. As an
example, Ee'eri states, "The Arab officer politicians have
no single outlook and no uniform ideology uniquely theirs."
(118:360) Yet another analyst, P.J. Vatikiotis , states
that, "The army officer corps represents the most cohesive
elite of younger enthusiasts linked together by vague
nationalistic aspirations and by concern for the social
and economic frustrations of their fellow citizens." (153:xiii)
Another problem is that, until the past few years, there
has been no systematic methodology that would indicate how
leaders filter information and perceive problems, or how the
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leader translates these perceptions into political action.
There has also been no method for updating a leader's
changing attitudes on a continuous basis. The operational
code performs these functions. Although content analysis
has been with us for some time, the operational code is a
type of content analysis specifically designed to define
the decision-making processes of political actors by
reference to the statements of the actor over time. In
short, the operational code construction asks the right
questions. In addition, the philosophical and instrumental
belief categories are structured so that additional infor-
mation can be analyzed and changes in belief patterns
noted.
A further problem in assessing the intentions of an
elite is the possibility that the actor in question may die
or cease to have influence on decisions. There is little
value in studying a leader who may be replaced tomorrow.
This thesis attempts to deal with this problem by proving
that the Egyptian military forms a group possessing a common
outlook and perception of the political universe, and that
future military leaders can be counted on to perceive




The operational code of the Egyptian military is a
result of many environmental inputs. Among these are the
Arab culture, the characteristics common to Arab military
establishments and to all military groups, and the Egyptian
military's status as a class. In discussing these variables
it will become obvious that the Egyptian code corresponds
to some aspects of each, but in some instances is exactly
the opposite. However, the code becomes clearer when evalu-
ated in the light of these factors.
A. THE ARAB CULTURE
1. Interpersonal Relationships
At the lowest level, the dominant characteristic of
Arab life is suspicion of one's surroundings. It has its
roots in the Bedouin stress on manliness on the one hand,
and the exaggerated conformity to the clan on the other.
This leads to intense rivalry and a sharp division of the
world into friends and enemies. (120:136) Another reason
for suspicion is the history of wars of conquest and the
resulting distrust of strangers. Consequently, Arab domestic
politics are characterized by ingroup/outgroup rivalries
that became anarchic at times. As Nasir once stated, "Every
man we questioned had nothing to recommend except to kill
someone else." (108:33) Because of this ingroup/outgroup
13

mentality, every Arab state is especially sensitive to
subversion.
The overriding concern of every Arab is honor (Sharaf)
and face (Wajh) . The world is seen as a constant threat to
the individual image. The Arabs 1 answer is an exaggerated
emphasis on virility. As an example, Arabs were humiliated
by the Israeli use of women to guard prisoners. (108:34)
Because of this constant threat, the Arab behavior pattern
is one of intense verbal hostility. This verbal hostility
is a substitute for battle and can be traced back to inter-
tribal warfare, which was characterized by scuffling, hurling
of insults, but very little actual killing, unless the
situation got completely out of hand. (148:214)
In addition to Arab threats being idle, they are used
to relieve pressure and insure that action will not be taken.
In point of fact, the intention or plan for doing something
takes the place of actually doing it. This is partly due
to the fact that the verbalization of an intent in the Arabic
language leaves the impression that something has already
been done. (148:62) It is also due to the Arab penchant for
exaggeration. An Arab can be more deeply moved by the
eloquent use of his language than can members of other
linguistic groups. An Arabic speaker will emphasize a point
three or four times to get across that he means what he says.
This chacteristic, combined with a lot of wishful thinking,
led the Arabs to greatly exaggerate their performance in
the 1967 war. It also creates a problem when dealing with
14

non-Arabs. A statement that seems emphatic to a westerner
might seem neutral to an Arab. (148:58)
2. Islam
From Islam the Arab gets his fatalism, which bene-
fits him by carrying him over the rough spots of life, but
retards him by making him adverse to any ambition to better
himself. (148:310) This fatalism manifests itself in the
Islamic belief in predestination. To the average muslim,
man is simply playing out the role Allah has set down for
him. Because of this belief, the concept of long-range
planning is almost an affront to the plan Allah has laid
down. Consequently he attributes the ills of the world and
the events which shape his life "to fate, to the devil, or
to imperialism." (148:152) As the operational code indicates,
the Egyptian military has apparently been able to overcome
this fatalistic attitude. Indeed, long-range planning is
one of their main occupations.
Islam also contributes to the view that human nature
is inherently depraved. If man is left to his own designs,
a Hobbsian war of all against all will result. Consequently,
Islam serves to bring order to the systems and to provide
security through an all-encompassing law of interpersonal
relationships, the Sharia law. (108:20) Since the Islamic
law orders the Arab society, muslims fear that westerniza-
tion will bring about the same transformation that it did
to Christianity. Not a loss of religous principles per se,
but a loss of the function of religon; for the muslin today
still depends on Islam as his inner sustaining force. (148:146
15

Islam is even more important to the officer class.
Islam, unlike Judeaism or Christianity, has military success
and conquest as its central idea, instead of martyrdom.
Although the liberal movement of the 1920 's weakened Islam,
as a community, it is unchanged. Islam buoys up the posi-
tion of the officer class, and the fact that Egyptian offi-
cers throughout the years have been involved with the Muslim
Brethren is no accident. Arab national awakening almost
always brings forth an Islamic revival. However, the Islamic
tradition also inhibits the officer corps. As modernizers
they have no desire to retain old social forms, and the
Islamic law is extremely difficult to ignore. (118:177)
Islam also contributes to the Arab view of history.
Muslim theologians profess that, although all events are
ultimately determined by God, man has the capacity to react
to each event. Consequently, chronology instead of cause
and effect is the dominant theme in Arab history.
3 . The Arabs and the West
An Arab considers himself the center of three cir-
cles. The inner circle is he and his relatives. The
middle circle is the western-introduced concept of a nation
as a distinct entity. The outer circle, and the one which
separates the Arabs from the rest of the world, is the
circle of Arab-speaking elites. (148:41)
This circle theory breeds a natural hostility toward
foreigners. To the Arab, just as all the muslims constitute
one nation, so do the unbelievers. Consequently, during the
16

1952 anti-British riots, several Copt churches were also
burned. (14 3:95) However, the Arab wants desperately to
participate in the culture of the west. Consequently, he
alternately feels admiration and envy, love and hate toward
the west. He wants to acquire western culture, yet he wants
to eliminate western influence from his country as far as
possible. Conversely, the Arab's feelings toward his own
country are ambivalent. He is a patriot, but he hates his
country for its backwardness. (148:198)
All of these attitudes color the Arab view of the
international environment, inter-Arab relations, and the
individual images that decision makers have of themselves.
On the international level, the Arabs see a permanent con-
flict between the Arab and Christian worlds. The Soviets
occupy an ambivalent position here. They are seen as allies
because of their hostility to the west, but hostile because
of the atheism of communism. The Arabs deal with them
politically but reject communism.
There is a feeling that the westerners are up to no
good, and they are seen as one monolithic religous system.
As an example, the late King Faysal equated Zionism with
communism because both emanated from the supposed monolithic
west. (108:24)
On the level of inter-Arab relations, the Arabs are
influenced by this same hatred of the west. Most of the
boundaries in the Arab world were artificially created by
western powers. Consequently, inter-Arab affairs are
17

characterized by territorial squabbles. Arab sovereigns
have no compunction about interfering in the affairs of
their neighbors. (108:28) As a result of these rivalries,
alliances are hard to maintain. Only when the problem of
Israel arose, did the Arabs make serious attempts at unity.
(148:274)
The predicament of westernization can be summed up
in the fact that, while Arabs hate the superiority of western
technology, Arab governments measure their success by the
yardstick of mass benefit to the people in terms of education,
literacy, etc. This is a decidedly western concept. (148:290)
4. Arab Politics
As a result of the Arab cultural experience and devo-
tion to Islam, Arab decision makers operate in a perceived
environment of hostility. Their culture stresses individual
or group honor, honor that must be restored by violent verbal
or physical action. (108:337) The Arab decision maker also
operates in a world of polarity, of contrasting concepts of
unity-diversity, shame and honor, aggression, yet submission
to the will of Allah. Thus his value judgments are usually
black or white. This polarity can be seen in the extremes
of emotion expressed by Arabs. A usually docile Arab is
not only capable of frequent outbursts of emotion, but is
encouraged to do so. (148:162) However, as to Arab rhetoric
not representing reality, there is another side to the coin.
Former Chief of Israeli Intelligence, Y. Harkabi, says that
it should be taken very seriously because it reflects the
18

wishes and mind set of the speaker. It creates s set of
expectations. As an example, President Sadat, beginning
in 1971 , began to issue threats that Egypt was going to do
something about the Sinai. These threats expressed a set
of aspirations which were eventually carried out. (108:8)
B. THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY
1. Military Interventions
Although the Egyptian military regime has many
unique characteristics, it is also like many other military
regimes throughout the world. There have been numerous
attempts to categorize and analyze military regimes. Welch
and Smith differentiate between "professional armies" whose
institutions are integral and who have distinct values
different from the rest of society, and the less professional
armies with fragmented institutional boundaries. (155:42)
Amos Perlmutter theorizes that there are two types of
armies, arbiter and ruler. The arbiter army rules for only
a limited time, develops no particular political ideology,
and tends to stick more to traditional military activities.
The ruler army works for direct military rule, develops its
own political institutions, and tends to be more radical.
He believes that the Egyptian military is one of these.
(149:4)
Most military regimes come to power through inter-




a. Low level of political institutionalization and lack
of sustained support for political institutions
b. Weak and ineffective political parties
c. Frequent civilian intervention in the military
d. Defeat in war
e. Foreign intervention
f. Conflicts among junior and senior officers
g. Involvement in internal pacification which brings the
army into politics
h. Armies with high internal cohesion
i. External military aid which facilitates role expansion
and greater autonomy of the armed forces, and gives them
new expertise
j. Social mobilization that produces new officer class
k. Expanding content of military officers 1 education to
encompass political issues customarily resolved by civilians
1. Perceived deterioration of economic conditions,
especially accompanied by the belief that the government
cannot resolve this deterioration (155:10)
The degree to which the military controls a society
is dependent upon:
a. Whether the officers are drawn from or incorporated
into the same social strata as the governing elite. If so,
military participation will be high.
b. Participation of the people in the political process.
c. Image of the military within society.




e. Morris Janowitz best summarized one of the reasons
for military participation in politics when he said, "The
basis of authority and discipline in the military establish-
ment has shifted from authoritarian domination to greater
reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus.
The new shift of the military requires that the professional
officer develop more and more of the skills and orientation
common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders.
The narrowing difference in skill between military and
civilian society is an outgrowth of the increasing concen-
tration of technical specialists in the military." (137:8)
Officers with close ties to individuals or groups
that are opposed to government policies form the nucleus of
conspiracies aimed at military intervention. However, mili-
tary intervention resulting from specific policy grievances
may lead to the restoration of civilian rule when the griev-
ances have been rectified. Distrust of the total political
system leads to military regimes of long duration. (155:23)
2 . Arab Military Regimes
As mentioned before, military intervention in the
Middle East is simply a continuation of the Islamic heritage
Beginning with the first modern army coup in Iraq in 1936,
there have been 35 coups in the Middle East in the middle
third of the twentieth century. There are several charac-
teristics common to Arab military coups:
a. When Arab officers take over, it is to rid the country
21

of corruption. It is rarely the result of an external
threat. (118:360)
b. Officers who seize power tend to promote the military
ideology of the soldier as the ideal model.
c. Many Arab armies, and specifically Egypt, tend to
think of themselves as the instrument of the new middle
class. (134:253)
d. Nearly all of the Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and
Iraqi officers who have staged coups fought on the Palestine
front in 1948. (131:52)
e. One third of all coups have taken place without the
help of civilian organization. (131:259)
f. Between 1949 and 1967 there were 30 military coups in
six Arab countries and only in two instances, both in Syria,
did the officers hand over rule to civilian leaders.
(131:259)
g. Foreign influence is minimal.
h. Many officers who have participated in coups have been
trained in their own country instead of abroad. (119:363)
i. The establishment of a revolutionary command council
is normal
.
j . Two of every three armies in the Middle East are
career armies. (136:431)
k. In being the innovators of western technology, the




As a general rule, the armies that come to power
in the Middle East possess five percent or less officers
who are politically active. They come to power through a
military coup and then establish a political ideology to
sustain them. The old politics are labeled status quo.
Modernization, industrialization, and mobilization become
the new creeds. However, the army is usually more reformer
than radical. It opposes rapid modernization under a one
party system, unless dominated by them, and as such is in
many cases anti-communist, as with Nasir's regime. (149:16)
3. Egypt ' s Regime
The Egyptian regime is one of the longest army-based
regimes in modern times. (155:179) One reason is that
Nasir's attempt to reprofessionalize the army and his insis-
tence that the army not become involved in politics has
prevented the Egyptian revolution from being shaken by a
succession of military coups, as have such regimes as Syria
and Iraq. (130:392) There are also other differences between
the Egyptian coup and others like Iraq and Syria. The Egyptian
officers who carried out the coup in 1952 were different
in that they were of medium or low rank and were born between
1917 and 1922, as opposed to the Syrian and Iraqi officers
who were born before 1900. (118:74) The Egyptian coup was
one of the few in the Middle East that occurred without the
cooperation of civilians. (130:392) The Egyptian army
itself is somewhat unlike others in the Middle East in
that the army since the Arabi revolt at the turn of the
23

century has been an independent political force. The main
decision in 1952 was whom to give loyalty to. This is in
contrast to the Jordanian army for instance, which represents
the classic Ottoman army. It was recruited from Bedouin and
Circassian minorities and sees its function as protecting
the Hashamite kingdom. It is basically non-political and
non-nationalistic. (149:11)
In some ways, however, the Egyptian regime is like
others in the Middle East. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are
similar because the officers came from the urban and middle
classes and felt no attachment to the conservative landowners.
(119:369) The Egyptian coup was also typical in that combat
officers in the armour division were recruited to partici-
pate. Also the threat of retaliation by the ruling monarchy
forced the conspirators to set a definite date. As with
Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, Egyptian officers abolished
the monarchy and substituted a one-party system with the
revolutionary command council at the top. (130:373) At
first, like other armies, the Egyptian army suffered from
the demise of professional rank and status due to situations
in which junior officers play a role superior to that of
senior officers because of their political expertise. Major
Salem in the early days of the regime is an example. However,
this has not been true in recent years. Nasir's efforts to




C. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN SOCIETY
1. Internal Structure of the Military
In the last years of the monarchy, the ruling family
began to see the results of their fateful decision to allow
lower class boys to enter the military academy in 1936.
The officers who would eventually lead the revolution of
1952 were native Egyptians from a variety of groups. In most
cases fathers were middle grade officials, army officers,
village notables, and merchants. Most were middle or upper
middle class. Half of the fourteen original RCC members had
relatives who were officers. (118:319) A small portion
were urban business people. There were no representatives
of the peasant class, artesans , or small shopkeepers. At
the other end there were no large land owners ' or aristo-
crats* sons. Unlike the Iraqi officer corps, there were
also very few sons of muslim religious functionaries.
(118:316) Many were sons of village leaders, an example
being Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer , an original member of the
RCC and Minister of War from 1955 to 1969.
The officer corps on the whole is not political.
The Free Officer corps contained only about 50 real activists
with another 300 politically active out of 20,000 before
1952. Since 1955 the composition of the officer corps has
remained essentially the same. However, although most
officers are still recruited from the small town middle
class, because of the elimination of bodaliyya, or payment
25

for military service, university students and secondary
school graduates have started to enter service. President
Nasir encouraged university students to enter the army after
the 1967 war in an attempt to revitalize his officer corps.
This, however, may lead to problems in the long run. Although
these young officers performed admirably in 1973, tradi-
tionally students have felt that they have been the vanguard
of revolution and resent the exclusion of the students 1
voice in the regime. (153:230)
In addition to the student faction, Leonard Binder
found divisions within the armed forces based on age group,
fields of specialization, staff versus line, old services
such as the Air Force versus new services such as the para-
troops, and the educational differences resulting from the
entry of medical and engineering students. He also noted
that there had been a notable increase in the prestige of
the engineering officer over line officers due to the
development projects within the Egyptian society which the
army has taken over. (121:422)
One of the chief problems within the military has
always been the wide gulf between officer and enlisted.
Be'eri cites examples in the 1956 Suez campaign of captured
Egyptian officers who wanted better conditions for themselves
,
but never asked about their men. Although after the Yemen
war the military academy was opened to sergeant majors who
had served in Yemen, and privates who had two years active
service, generally it is still restricted to graduates of
26

secondary schools; thus the gap between officer and enlisted
is maintained. (118:324) However, much of this problem has
been eliminated by the influx of idealistic young university
students.
There is also a gulf between high ranking officers
and the mid level captains and majors. The latter group's
salaries are not commensurate with their rank and promotion
is slow.
Unlike some more highly politicized armies like
Syria, jumping of ranks is unheard of in the Egyptian army.
General Amer, who was promoted in 1963 from major to brigadeer
general, is a rare exception. (118:322) However, since the
revolution, rank is attained somewhat more quickly than
before. Before the revolution, colonel was attained at
about 2 6 years service. Now the average time is about 20
years. Some officers attain the rank of brigadeer by the
time they are 42 years of age.
Amos Perlmutter estimates that today the ruling
group in the army consists of 1,000 loyal officers, headed
by a small group of remaining free officers. (149:112) In
an analysis of a few of the top-ranking officers today, it
is apparent that the Egyptian elite is still that group of
officers who were in the army at the time of the 1952 revo-
lution. Although many were not part of the small free
officers group, all have ties with either Nasir or Sadat.





a. Born around 1920.
b. A free officer.
c. If not a free officer, friendship with Nasir or Sadat.
d. Graduation from the military academy around 1938.
e. Graduation from the staff college in 1950.
f. Participation in the 1948 war in Palestine.
g. Training in the Soviet Union.
h. From a middle class family in the Upper Nile region.
Following are a few of the leaders who have been
influential in recent years
:
a. General Ismail Ali — General Ismail Ali was appointed
director of intelligence by Sadat in 1971. In 1972 he
became Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War. He died in
1974. Born in 1913, he was slightly older than other elites.
He graduated from the military academy with Nasir and attended
Staff College at the same time. He was one of the first
to study in the Soviet Union in 1957. He also participated
in the 1948 war in Palestine. (117:14)
b. General Muhammed al-Gammasy — General Gammasy replaced
General Ismail Ali as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of
War. He was born in the Upper Nile region in 1921. His
father was a textile merchant. He graduated from the mili-
tary academy in 1939 with the present Chief of Staff, General
Fahmi, and one year later than Nasir and Sadat. He also
graduated from the Staff College in 1950 and studied
armoured tactics in the Soviet Union. Of all the elites,
he is unusual in that he also studied tank warfare in the
United States in 1948-49. (140:6)
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c. Lt. General Muhammed Ali Fahmi — General Fahmi was
born in the Upper Nile region in 1920. He graduated from
the military academy with General Gammasy in 1939 and from
the Staff College in 1952. He studied air defense in the
Soviet Union in 1964 and was commander of the air defense
forces during the 1973 war. He was named Chief-of-Staf
f
in 1975. (115:5)
d. General Saadeddin al Shazli — General Shazli was born
in 1922. He graduated from the military academy in 1940
and the Staff College in 1952. He is a paratrooper trained
in the Soviet Union in 1958. In 1969 he was appointed
commander of the Special Forces and planned the canal
crossing in 1973. (117:14)
e. General Husni Mubarak — General Mubarak is somewhat
younger than the other elites and is presented here as an
example of the new breed of elites. However, he still has
some of the characteristics of the other military leaders.
He was born in 1928 in the same district in the Upper Nile
region that Sadat comes from. He graduated from the War
College in 1949 and entered the Air Force as a fighter pilot,
He received training in the Soviet Union as a bomber pilot
in the late 1950' s and was subsequently named head of the
Air Force Academy in 1968, Air Force Chief-of-Staf f in
1969, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in 1972, and
Vice President of Egypt in 1975. In this last move he was
promoted over Generals Fahmi and Gammasy, and as a personal




2. The Military in Egyptian Society
The question of whether the Egyptian military repre-
sents a specific class has been debated frequently. Writing
in 1961, P.J. Vatikiotis stated that the army officer class
in Egypt is probably not a class in the sense that it
shares similar social backgrounds or economic interests,
but "Rather the army officers corps represents the most
cohesive elite of younger enthusiasts linked together by
vague nationalist aspirations and by concern for the social
and economic frustrations of their fellow citizens." (They
do share though a common educational background: secondary
school, military academy, and some even staff college.)
(153:xiii) Eric Nordlinger believes that the Egyptian offi-
cer is part of a new middle class that is a salaried class
of teachers, administrators, scientists, lawyers, engineers,
and white collar workers. This position makes them effec-
tive agents of social change. (147:1132) Leonard Binder
believes that the military officer is part of a new middle
class because, "In 1882 the native military officer group
was the only one directly blocked from advancement within a
bureaucratic framework by a foreign element. By 1952 nearly
all the educated middle class found itself in a similar
situation..." (121:421) Amos Perlmutter feels that the so-
called new middle class is only an extension of the old
bourgeoisie. "Thus the theory of a new middle class does
not explain social change. At best, it can only explain
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patterns of conflict over political power within the
strata of the middle class." He also feels that there is
no cohesion in this class because social status fragments
the civilian and military sectors, and sets them against
each other. (129:100)
In summary, the argument seems to center around
motive rather than origin. The question is not whether army
officers come from the same rural, middle class backgrounds
that many other professionals come from. It is rather whether
the military elite represents the middle class or uses it
for political capital. Be'eri's analysis of the social
origins and family background of 87 officers killed in the
Palestine War in 1948 proves that most officers come from
rural middle class backgrounds. (149:113) Be'eri states
that, "Although the average general is not affected by the
fact that his father was a carpenter to the same extent that
a lawyer would be, the effect is still there; and the effect
on the captain is greater than on the general." (118:294)
Since the social strata from which the officer
corps is drawn also produces most of the professional men
like lawyers and doctors , the army officers consider them-
selves intelligencia in uniform. However, they are the
products of a narrow, fundamental Islamic education and also
receive a rather narrow education at the academy. Thus,
although shrewd, they tend to be anti-intellectual and anti-
western. (149:58) There are few liberals and most favor
social reforms but have been accused of being indifferent
to the values of individual freedom." (118:360)
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The basic motivation for these men to go into the
army is of course as a vehicle for advancement. Many young
officers think of their military careers as good training
for high administrative posts in government and private
enterprise. (120:395) There is a tendency toward early
retirement to avoid low pensions by going into industry,
and there is even a high-ranking officer in the Public
Relations Bureau who finds jobs for retiring officers.
(121:422) As Hans Daalder has noted, "The skills learned
within the military may be applied to civilian pursuits.
After the officers and men leave the service, the rational
basis of military organization has a spillover effect upon
organizational patterns throughout the society." (122:1133)
Their dominance in the civilian sector has been well docu-
mented. During the eight Nasir cabinets, the percentage of
officers fluctuated between 45% and 32%. From 1952 to 1967
only one civilian held one of the top four government posts.
(149:112) In 1964, 43 out of 73 ambassadors were still
former officers. (149:116) Welch and Smith estimate that
after the 1967 war 65% of the leadership posts were held by
officers. (155:200) In 1967 all ten men at the top were
officers. (123:23) Since Sadat took office, the political
departments like Defense, National Guidance, and the Foreign
Office have been dominated by officers, while the more




In the final analysis, it appears that the public
has come to accept the military regime for several reasons.
First, the Middle East has had a tradition of military
regimes because of the Islamic tradition of military con-
quest. (131:251) Secondly, military officers have always
played an important role in Egyptian politics with the
exception of the period of British control. (155:185)
Thirdly, the public has witnessed the breakdown in parlia-
mentary systems, and the army has proven itself to be a
good organizer. (153:243) Monroe Berger has stated, "What-
ever the regime's political motives may be in placing dozens
of officers in high posts, their performance of these
civilian functions has not been militaristic or unresponsive
to non-military requirements." (119:21)
However, the army's rationale for control may be
disappearing. At first the rise of the officer class was
accompanied by the advancement of technocrats and technology
As the army modernized, it forced the society to do likewise
It was able to lead the way because of its technological
expertise and ties with the west. The Egyptian army was
the first to send its officers to Europe, the first to
introduce European dress, and the first organization in
Egypt to introduce compulsory education. However, with
the modernization of the 20th century, there are many other
groups whose education is equal to or superior to that of
the officer class. Thus the officers have lost one of their
rationalizations for leadership. The army now must claim





A review of the history of the military is especially
important in the case of Egypt. As the operational code
will show, Egyptian military leaders depend on lessons learned
for their source of knowledge, perhaps more than most other
elites. The fact that history never repeats itself is not
relevant here. The military elite believes that it does,
and their interpretation of specific events influences their
decision-making processes immensely. The historical discussion
also forms a structure for evaluating changes in the opera-
tional code. The period from 1955 to 1961 was marked by
the consolidation of the military regime's power and its
rise to leadership in the Arab world. However, in 1961
several events occurred which began to erode the military s
confidence and power. By 1967 the military was aggressively
seeking to reassert itself. The 1967 defeat marked the
military's low ebb, and the 1967 to 1973 period was charac-
terized by the military's frantic efforts to regain its
lost honor. The 1973 war accomplished this and the 1973
to 1975 period was characterized by a secure and powerful
military. Since each one of these periods was a different
experience for the military, the operational code is
constructed so as to note changes between periods.
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B. EGYPT BEFORE NASIR
A logical starting point for a historical analysis of
the Egyptian military is Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in
1798. This event is of major historical interest to the
Arabs because, in their view, the invasion jogged their
historical memory and set the Arab world on a new course
toward modernization. Its importance to the Egyptian mili-
tary lies in the fact that it brought to Egypt Muhammed
Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, and with him a foreign
elite that would rule Egypt until the 1952 revolution.
Morroe Berger has stated, "Indeed, Egypt since Napoleon
provides a good example of the introduction of social change
under the impetus of military considerations designed to
increase the nation's power in the international arena."
(120:370) Muhammed Ali also began the cycle which would
lead to a land-holding elite, foreign control of the mili-
tary, and the ultimate politization of the army. Ali cen-
tralized control in his own hands in both the bureaucracy
and the army, and his army became one of the strongest in
the Middle East. However, it was a mercenary army led by
Turks, Circassians, and Georgians. He preferred this to
taking the stolid fellahin out of the fields where he was
producing for the dynasty. (149:30) Although a few fella-
hin were admitted as officers, they seldom, if ever, achieved
high rank. The first revolt against this foreign domination
was the Arabi uprising in 1879. It was the last large-scale
uprising before the British occupation and, although its
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chief cause was officer discontent with low rank, it became
a spearhead for an overall reaction against foreign influence
During the first half of this century, Egypt was under
British domination. The activities of the Egyptian army
during the occupation can be summed up in the fact that it
did not fire a shot in anger between 1899 and 1945, with
the exception of skirmishes with smugglers. During this
period the movement for independence took two forms. The
first was the Wafd party, formed in 1919 from a coalition
of groups devoted to westernization and de-Islamization.
It was Egypt's first mass party. However the Wafd was soon
enveloped in oligarchic politics, and by the end of World
War II had been coopted by the monarchy. It had become the
status quo party.
The second movement, and the one which served as a
vehicle for the future free officers, was the anti-western
Islamic revival spearheaded by the Muslim Brethren. It
found its supporters in the disaffected lower middle class,
both urban and rural, civilian and military. The Muslim
Brethren influence on the military was increased immeasurably
by the decision of the monarchy to admit men from the lower
class families to the military academy in 1936. The men
who entered the academy under this new policy were men like
Gamal Abdul Nasir, the son of a postal official. He, Sadat,
Abdel Hakin Amer, and others were not only from the same
middle class background, but had been politically active
as early as high school. (118:44)
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These young officers who graduated in 1938 were galled
by the presence of British troops on Egyptian soil and the
preferential treatment given to non-Egyptians in the array.
This dissatisfaction manifested itself in support for the
Germans in World War II. Anwar Sadat was among the boldest
officers hoping for a German victory. He was also one of
the most loyal to the Muslim Brethren. (149:46) However,
this was not typical. Both the Muslim Brethren and another
anti-foreign group, Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) were com-
peting for influence in the army. The Society of Free
Officers formed in 1948 contained that group of officers
who did not care to ally with either faction. These Free
Officers were indeed fortunate in that their motivation for
status and nationalism happened to coincide with that of
the rising new social and economic class in civilian
society. (153:218)
The Palestine War of 1948 was the catalyst which set in
motion the forces which would lead to the overthrow of the
regime. The Egyptian General Command had opposed partici-
pation in the war, but as Heikal stated in his Political
Memoirs , "The resort to war to distract attention from internal
difficulties is a common policy frequenty used by dicta-
torial states in modern and ancient history." (132:5) Indeed
the monarchy insisted on absolute rule since World War II
and the continually worsening economy had produced extremist
political religious groups, increased terrorism, and a
feeling among Egyptians that the only answer was revolution.
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This reappraisal by Egyptians was only accentuated by the
loss of Palestine. The loss was explained by the young
officers as an inevitable outcome of social grievance; not
as a cause but rather as an effect, and the beaten soldiers
returned from the front not as culprits , but as victims
of the excesses of the monarchy. (118:53)
C. THE 1952 COUP
The young officers returned from Palestine with an
increased political awareness of civilian interference in
the affairs of the military. A movement within the officer
corps was now a necessity. Egypt at the time was experi-
encing increased pressure due to social mobilization. One
fourth of the population lived in cities of over 20,000 in
1937. One third fit this category at the time of the revo-
lution, and by 1966 two fifths lived in cities. (155:190)
This was the new middle class. It lacked jobs, a standard
of living, or a political voice. Peace had been maintained
for centuries by an Islamic code which called for obedience
to a political structure sanctioned by God. The new middle
class lacked these traditional values and became a perfect
vehicle for the military.
The date for the establishment of the Free Officers
movement varies , but it is certain that it became active
after the Palestine war. At the time of the coup, there
were approximately 250 members of the Free Officers movement
with a tight nucleus of ten to fifteen. (118:92) As men-
tioned before, the movement kept itself separate from
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civilian groups and was one of the few to come to power
without the aid of the civilian sector.
The event which triggered the revolution was the offi-
cers club election of 1951. King Farouk supported a man
for the head of the officers club who had been cashiered
for corruption but later reinstated as Chief of Staff. The
officers' candidate was General Mohammed Naguib, a hero of
the Palestine war and respected officer. When he was elected,
King Farouk dismissed the officers club executive committee
and formed a new cabinet with his brother as Minister of
War. At the same time riots were taking place in the canal
zone over the refusal of the British to evacuate the canal
zone. The Free Officers decided to act.
The officers who took action were middle grade officers
with an average age of 33. The executive committee consisted
of ten majors, two lieutenant colonels, and two captains,
with General Naguib being brought in at the end as titular
head. All had graduated from the military college around
1938. Five were graduated from the Staff College in 1950.
As an indicator of their capabilities, one thousand officers
had been found suitable for the Staff College for this class.
Twenty six were picked. (118:85)
A quick and easy coup took place on 22 July 1952, and
a Revolutionary Command Council was formed from the execu-
tive committee of the Free Officers movement. They took
control with specific grievances against the throne, but
only general attitudes about political affairs. Nasir,
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unlike leaders of coups in Iraq and Syria, enjoyed the
confidence of his co-conspirators and thus was able to hold
them together and develop a political ideology later. Binder
states that this group's sole claim to authority was the
fact that they, among all the disaffected groups, had taken
the initiative. (121:421)
On 18 June 1953, the RCC dissolved the monarchy and
declared Egypt a republic. All of the members donned civilian
garb with the exception of Abdel Hakin Amer, who was desig-
nated Commander-in-Chief of the army. Since that time the
military has had the following general chacteristics
:
1. Distrust of civilians. In a series of moves after
the revolution, Nasir viciously broke the unions and attempted
to establish a single government-controlled organization.
Nasir 's regime was characterized as a series of efforts to
create wide public support by a single political party con-
trolled at the top. In 1953 he established the Liberation
Rally, in 1957 the National Union, and in 1961 the present
day Arab Socialist Union. All have failed to gain support
even though the ASU has become more powerful under Sadat.
2. A desire to use the military as a model for society.
After the revolution, Nasir realized that he had a good
instrument for solving Egypt's economic problems. This was
the mammoth Egyptian Civil Service. However, he did not
trust it to civilian rule. A military man was put at each
level of the civil service, and the percentage of posts
occupied by military men has remained at about 40% ever
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since. (155:200) The military propensity for smooth coor-
dination, motivation and instruction from the top, and
consensus by command has eliminated political conflict and
political power at the lower levels. In addition, the flow
of communications is in one direction, from top to bottom.
3. An uncertain approach to economic reform. For the
first four years, economic activity continued as it had
before the revolution. However, in 1956 the government
turned to a more socialistic economy. Banks were nationalized,
maximum land holding size was reduced, and by 1965 the pay-
roll for government employees had doubled. (155:211) How-
ever, President Sadat has reversed this trend and has eased
the government's control of business. At this time Egyptian
society is moving toward a more equal capitalist-socialist
mix. This has given credence to the criticism that the
military never had a real cause, but simply seized the
opportunity to take power and cement their position at the
top of society. Nasir said in a speech in 1960, "We reached
our ideologies as a natural outcome of our experience.
"
(118:374)
4. Both Nasir and Sadat have made great use of their
charisma. As Dekmejian has stated, "The regime lacked the
ideology, inclination, and energy to shape the behavior of
every lowly Egyptian, although it tried to influence large
segments of the Egyptian people." (123:159) Nasir did this
by routinizing and institutionalizing charisma. His phenomenal
success in foreign policy and his ability to avoid becoming
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the vassal of either superpower made him a leader of pan-
Arabism without rival. Although many of Sadat's policies
have been unpopular in some quarters, he also remains the
leader of pan-Arabism.
After the revolution all officers of colonel or above
rank were ousted except General Mohammad Ibriham and General
Naguib. The vacant posts were not necessarily filled by
free officers, but by officers loyal to the movement.
According to Abd Al-Latif Baghdadi, an RCC member, decisions
during this period were made by himself, Nasir, Amer, Zacharia
Mohieden, Kamal Ad-Din Husayn, and Husayn Shafai. (154:101)
This group set out to indoctrinate the army middle and
junior ranks with a distinctive Nasirite ideology. The basic
difference between these Nasirites and the Muslim Brethren,
who were accelerating their attempts to convert the officer
corps, was the secular versus religious orientation. Both
stressed nationalism, but the Nasirites saw it as an economic
duty while the Muslim Brethren saw it as an obligation of
the Koran. In addition, the Muslim Brethren are violently
anti-western, while the Nasirites emulate western organiza-
tion and technology, even if they are philosophically
anti-western.
Two themes dominated the early years. The first was
the attempt by the RCC to convince the people that the
army was the army of the people. Members of the RCC fanned
out across the country, usually into their home districts,
to convince the people that they represented them. The
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second theme was the struggle with the Muslim Brethren.
The struggle centered around General Naguib ' s desire to
return to constitutional and parliamentary rule. When
Naguib was dismissed in February 1954, officers who followed
the Muslim Brethren protested. Although Naguib was brought
back temporarily, he was soon dismissed again. Now it was
open warfare between the Free Officers and the MB. An MB
laborer tried to assassinate Nasir on 26 October, 1954.
Nineteen MB leaders were put to death, and the MB were
outlawed.
D. 1955-1961
During this period the military cemented its authority
and enjoyed a period of unity and power that they would not
see again. General Amer's speech on the third anniversary
of the revolution indicated the objectives for the military:
1. A new generation of scientists and technicians.
2. Motorized divisions emphasizing maneuverability.
3. Home production of arms.
4. Training men to handle modern arms.
5. Army officers studying in Europe.
6. Emphasis on gigantic maneuvers.
7. Making life pleasant for conscripts. (1:1-10)
This last is of particular interest because Field
Marshal Amer's concern for the well being of his troops was
to make him immensely popular in the following years, and
indeed his power almost rivaled that of Nasir in the early
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1960 's. He operated throughout this period as an almost
independent entity and had exclusive jurisdiction over the
armed forces. Marshal Amer was a traditionalist and devout
muslim, the son of a prominent village notable. He dis-
couraged deviant behavior among the officers, but liked
them and often presented their case to Nasir. (149:179)
As Moore put it, "In discussing Nasir 's removal of power
centers, the one possible exception was the army, ruled
independently by his close friend and Vice President
Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer." (145:196)
As far as the military's position was concerned, "In
declaring itself against politics, i.e. against the exis-
tence of political groups in society which at least pur-
ported an alternative to power, the military regime had, by
1956, preempted all political activity in Egypt." (107:33)
The military had decided after the attempted assassination
by the MB in 1954 to isolate the Ulema, or religous hierarchy,
and had thusly eliminated them as opposition. The only
leftist free officer in power who might advance that cause
was Khalid Muhi al-Din. After his participation in the
19 54 coup attempt, he fell from power and has not been in
the inner circle since. (107:185) With no representation,
the leftist cause was quickly suppressed.
On the international scene, Nasir advanced the theory
of positive neutrality. This was his vehicle to rid Egypt
of European influence. Nasir 's emergence on the international
scene is well documented. In 1955 he agreed to buy arms from
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Czechoslovakia and later admitted that he was really dealing
with the Russians. The following year Nasir asked the United
States for aid in building the Aswan Dam. After initially
agreeing to the request, the United States abruptly withdrew
its offer. In retaliation, Nasir nationalized the Suez
Canal. On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai with
assurances that France and Britain would follow in four
days. (125:713) Aware that French aircraft were already
participating in the war and that British troops were massing
on Cyprus, Nasir ordered his army to take up defensive posi-
tions west of the canal. The air raids on Port Said caused
international furor, and pressure from the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
eventually forced the Israelis, British, and French to with-
draw. Politically, Nasir emerged from the Suez crisis
stronger than ever. However, militarily, it was a smashing
defeat. A large part of the arms recently acquired from the
Soviets were destroyed, and the western world was blanketed
with accounts of the speed and ease with which the Egyptian
army was defeated. (125:714) The fact that the Egyptian
army had pulled back in anticipation of a combined French
and British invasion was overlooked. The Suez War was the
second blow to the prestige of the military. However, it
paled in comparison to the 1967 war and did not significantly
affect the military's position.
During this period the military was also undergoing
changes. Nasir was intent on making the military non-
political and continued to promote young, professional,
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non-political officers. As Perlmutter says, "Divisional
commanders were clearly non-political, professional officers."
(149:143)
Within the Free Officers movement all of the leftists
had been eliminated by 1956. Anwar Sadat and Hasan Ibrihim
were relegated to secondary functions but would return to
power later. All that remained in the inner circle were
devout muslims junior in age to Nasir. (118:120)
One event in the closing years of this period led to
friction between Nasir and his officers. In 1958 the United
Arab Republic was founded with Syria, with the full coopera-
tion of the Syrian Baathists , who feared a communist take-
over. When a coup in 1961 in Syria dissolved the UAR, many
officers, some very close to Amer, were highly vocal in
their criticsm of Nasir' s heavy-handed approach and many
were arrested.
E. 1961-67
Although the reputation of the military was beginning
to erode as the Yemeni war wore on, those officers who
stayed in uniform did not have a bad time. Most received
training at an Institute of Higher Studies of National
Defense. A new rank of Army General was created, thus
permitting more generals. Along with this top-heavy trend,
staff officers continued to receive greater and greater
weight in decision making. This would be a significant
factor in the 1967 war. (109:xxviii) In addition, the Free
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Officers kept control at the top to prevent the kind of
coup that occurred in 1952. This contributed to a general
lack of organization and communication. (130:121)
Outside of the army, events in the Arab world were
heading toward a climax. Nasir had advocated a long term
struggle with Israel and likened it to the struggle against
the crusaders. During the Yemeni war he vehemently opposed
a war with Israel because of troop commitments. However,
Nasir was being pressured from all sides. Professor John
Amos has chronicled some of the reasons for Nasir' s decision
to press the Israelis.
1. Nasir' s economic projects had failed and the middle
class was discontent.
2. Nasir had lost his image as the leader of the Arab
world because of his refusal to come to the aid of Syria
in the 1966 war.
3. Nasir and King Faysal were locked in a titanic battle
for leadership. Faysal thought that Nasir was trying to
use Yemen as a springboard for the invasion of the Arabian
peninsula.
4. Nasir was becoming increasingly suspicious of the
U.S. and suspected a U.S. (Israeli), Saudi plot. (108:56)
Into the breach stepped General Amer and the military.
The military at the time was suffering from the same malady
that would plague them until 1973. The army had performed
poorly in 1948, 1956, and in Yemen. Amer, some say with the
backing of Sadat, felt that a well-armoured Egyptian army
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could at least hold the Israelis for two weeks and, if the
war were not a clear victory, at least it would be a major
achievement. In addition, General Amer and Air Force
General Fawzi were able to convince Nasir that Egyptian
rockets could destroy Israeli air attacks and that Egypt
should strike while the Israelis were not mobilized. Low
key maneuvers by the Israelis indicated to Nasir that the
Israelis did not want to fight and that a political victory
was possible. As is well known, Nasir closed the Gulf of
Aqaba, stationed troops around the Straits of Tiran, and
requested that the U.N. peace-keeping force be removed.
Israel attacked on 6 June 1967. The Egyptian army lost 30%
of its equipment and about 17,000 killed or wounded. (108:91)
Although Egyptian units fought well in static situations,
commanders were unable to improvise. The Egyptian High
Command panicked and ordered retreat over the objections
of its own planning staff. (108:92)
In the field the Egyptian army lacked leadership. The
men did not trust their officers and inter-Arab cooperation
was non existent. Heikal claims that Amer ' s order to with-
draw meant that 80% of the Egyptian army never engaged the
enemy. (133:181) This defeat, and the purge of the military
afterward, set the tone for the third period under
consideration.
F. 1967-73
The shift in the thinking of the military after 1967 is
evident in their operational code. The events of the period
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indicate that a shift in the code was almost inevitable.
The period between 1967 and 1971 was a struggle for power
between the Nasirist bureaucracy, the military, and the
technocrats led by Ali Sabri. (149:160) The military was at
a disadvantage during this struggle for obvious reasons.
The 1967 war separated the military from the political
leadership. The military felt betrayed. They felt that
Nasir should have pre-empted Israel in the middle of May,
instead of waiting for Israel to attack. In addition,
Nasir had first accepted full blame for the war, then
retracted his statement fifteen hours later and demanded
the resignation of 30 senior officers. Thus began a purge
of some 300 officers. Many of the officers purged were Air
Force, possibly due to the fact that close to 120 Egyptian
planes were shot down, compared to 30 Israeli planes. (149:84)
However, a more significant point is that all of the officers
who were purged in 1967 were political activists. (149:192)
Nasir' s reasons for the purge are not clear. Ee'eri states
that, "The top commanders of the Egyptian army were not
better or worse than the other leaders of the country; they
were not more or less efficient than their subordinates and
not more or less corrupt than the ideologists or the propa-
gandists. But they were made the scapegoats for the disaster."
(118:127) It is Be'eri's contention that a small part of
the officer corps was sacrificed to save the ruling class
and that the subsequent buildup by the Soviets enhanced the
prestige of the army. On the other hand, Perlmutter states
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that, "On the whole, Nasir was not harsh enough with the
army." (149:191) Be that as it may, Marshal Amer, Minister
of War Badran, and six of the seven full generals resigned.
General Muhammad Fawzi became Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces. Shortly after Marshal Amer resigned, he was
accused of conspiring with members of the intelligence corps
to overthrow the government. The man who had led the Egyptian
army for so long was requested to commit suicide and apparently
complied on 15 September 1967. Amer had been the army's
protector within the ruling elite and an almost autonomous
power since 1961. His death and the general humiliation of
the war marked the low point in Egyptian military history.
As the operational code will indicate, the armed forces as
a whole became fanatical in their determination to retrieve
their honor, even to the point of totally subjugating them-
selves to a corps of Soviet advisors. In fact, George
Haddad has stated, "A further cause for the purging of the
officers was the alleged Soviet intervention to remove the
military bourgeoisie and the anti-socialist commanders."
(130:124) This did not endear the top military officers to
the Russians. Many officers were so disgruntled at the
apparent Soviet intervention and the long prison sentences
given to the Air Commander (15 years) and the Vice Air
Marshal (10 years) that they stopped wearing uniforms in
the streets.
To the general populace, the 1967 war was styled al-
nahsa, the set back, and was blamed on U.S. intervention.
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However, the 1967 war, like Vietnam, was a media war and
the sense of loss was much greater to Arabs everywhere
because of the media coverage. Much of the rath of the
public was aimed at the military. The public's rage was
fueled by Mohammad Heikal, editor of Al-Ahrara, who repeatedly
attacked all levels of command. He attacked the higher
echelons for lack of nerve and accused many officers of
being promoted for non-professional reasons. He stated
that:
1. Many officers had been in the same post for up to
fifteen years, which led to bureaucratic inflexibility.
2. Highly qualified officers were taken out of the
military and used in administrative posts as mayors of
small towns, etc.
3. Officers cared only for pay and promotions.
4. Relationships between officers and men were couched
in mutual distrust. (108:115)
On a more pragmatic level, General Riad, who became
Commander-in-Chief in 1968, stated that the loss was due
to:
1. Loss of air superiority.
2. Lack of organizational control and coordination.
3. Loss of communications. (108:115)
It was these shortcomings that the military set out
to correct.
One of Nasir's first steps was to reorganize the army.
By 1969 the Egyptian Air Force had been reorganized three
51

times, even though the Israeli Air Force Commander, General
Hod, had stated that the Air Force command had done every-
thing it could under the circumstances in 1957. (108:113)
One of Nasir's most important decisions, however, was to
triple the size of the standing forces and to recruit as
many college students as possible. The goal was to upgrade
combat efficiency by raising the educational level. Heikal
reports that of the 800,000 Egyptians under arms in 1973,
110,000 were university graduates. (133:35) Nasir had given
the order that any tank commander or officer responsible for
electronic equipment must be a graduate of either an engineer-
ing or technical school. This decision was to increase the
size of the armed forces and put a tremendous stain on the
economy. The decision to increase the number of college
students in the military produced an officer corps dissatis-
fied with the government's policies. As a result, two
conspiracies to kill Nasir were reported between May and
June of 1963. Both were said to be organized by officers
with civilian help.
Another factor which significantly affected the attitudes
of the military during this period was the continued influx
of Russians. According to Heikal, the seeds of discontent
had been growing since the 1955 Czech arms deal because:
1. The weapons that the Russians sent were unfamiliar.
2. Instruction manuals were in Russian.




4. The generals who were sent to the Soviet Union batween
1955 and 1967 like Riad, Ismail, Fawzi, Mortaga, and Sadiq
were already graduates of western military academies and
disliked going back to the classroom and having instructors
younger than themselves teaching them.
5. Instruction was through interpreters, and even when
Egyptian officers spoke Russian well enough to dispense with
interpreters, they were not allowed to attend some briefings.
6. Russian party literature attacked Egyptian officers
for being bourgeois and lacking the background for a
successful struggle. (133:180)
Nasir did not help matters by ordering that advice from
Soviet experts was binding. This especially galled the
Egyptians, who felt that they were better qualified by
virtue of combat experience. The quality of the advisors,
especially in the Air Force, was another problem. It was
suspected that the Russians were using Egypt as an all
weather training base for young pilots. Soviet military
advisors were openly contemptuous of Egyptian pilots and
refused to recommend supplying them with the most recent
arms. To make matters worse, Soviet advisors took increasing
control in selection and promotion of officers. (130:139)
They also had the irritating habit of pumping Egyptian
officers for political opinions — not a popular approach
for an army whose strength and cohesiveness lay in its
ability to avoid splitting itself politically.
53

Nasir, realizing that his army was unpopular with the
people and in turn the army was becoming increasingly dis-
satisfied with the Russians, decided that the best way to
avoid a coup and raise morale was to continue the war.
Backed by military leaders, Nasir engaged in a war of
attrition from 1968 to 1970. The war was designed to:
1) let Egyptian troops fight set piece battles backed up
by numerically superior artillery, 2) create the impression
that the 1967 war was not over, 3) try to head off the
proponents of unconventional warfare who were challenging
Egypt for leadership, namely the Palestinians. (108:126)
Unfortunately, the war of attrition ended disastrously with
a ceasefire sponsored by Secretary of State Rogers in August
1970. The military, who had originally backed the plan,
became disenchanted with the "no peace, no war" situation.
In addition, the Israeli air raids convinced Nasir to hand
over complete responsibility for air defense to the Russians
in 1970. However, in September 1970, the fortunes of the
military began to change. In that month President Nasir,
who had controlled his military to some degree for 15 years,
died. The main contenders for rule were: 1) Anwar Sadat,
who had not served in any capacity of real responsibility
during Nasir 's reign, but who was a good speaker, a devout
muslim, and the apologist for the revolution; 2) Ali Sabri
,
Nasir 's liaison with the Soviets and the spokesman for the
Arab Socialist Union; 3) Zakhariyya Muhi al-Din, a moderate
who had been named by Nasir as his successor. (130:158)
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Oddly enough the leftist, feeling that they did not have
the power to take complete control, moved to put Sadat's
name in nomination, thinking that he could be easily swayed.
One of those who helped to elect Sadat was General Muhammad
Fawzi, a non-political professional and strict disciplinarian
who had succeeded General Riad as Minister of War after
General Riad s death in 1969.
By 1971 the leftists had become disenchanted with their
inability to control Sadat. A group headed by Ali Sabri,
head of the ASU, Shara Gum' a, head of the secret police,
and Sami Sharif, Nasir's former intelligence aid, moved to
oust Sadat. They received the support of General Fawzi,
probably only because Fawzi had family ties with Sami Sharif.
The plan was for General Fawzi and key military personnel
to affect the coup. Sabri and his group would then consoli-
date power. (149:194) Early in 1971 the leftist newspaper
Taliah began to make anti-Sadat statements. When Sadat's
plan to unite Egypt with Lybia and the Sudan was voted down
by the Sabri-led ASU, Sadat knew that a coup was in progress.
He turned to two professional military men for support — Chief
of Staff Muhammad Sadiq and General Sa'd Shazli, a hero of
the 1967 war. He also received the support of 100 officers
ousted by Nasir in 1967. (149:193) The Sabri group was
crushed and with it the radical elements who had been gaining
influence since 1967. General Fawzi was dismissed and
General Sadiq was appointed Minister of Defense. General
Shazli became army Chief of Staff and General Ismail Ali was
called out of retirement to become Chief of Intelligence.
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After consolidating power, Sadat was confronted with
the same problem which Nasir had dealt with since 1952, a
disgruntled military. There were two factors during the
1972-73 period which disturbed the military. The first was
the reluctance of the Russians to provide arms and the
growing influence of Russian advisors. The center of this
controversy was the Minister of War and Commander in Chief,
General Sadiq. After taking over in 1971, General Sadiq
began to lobby persistently for a decrease in Russian influ-
ence. Russians continually tried to woo Sadiq because of
his obvious popularity among the armed forces and the popu-
larity of his anti-Soviet stand. (130:171) In addition,
Sadiq was popular with both junior and senior officers for
his efforts in raising their salaries. (108:148) However,
Sadiq 's beliefs were becoming increasingly bothersome to
President Sadat. General Sadiq was in favor of total war
and thus made large demands on the Russians for weapons.
This only highlighted the Russians' reticence in supplying
arms. The final straw came in October 1972 when Sadiq refused
to mount an offensive against the Israelies without more
sophisticated weapons. (108:149) After heated discussion,
Sadiq, along with the Deputy Minister of War, Commander of
the Navy, and Commander of the Central Military Area were
dismissed. General Ismail Ali was elevated to Minister of
War. (130:183) This sent tremors throughout the armed
forces. Throughout 197 2 rumors of mutiny circulated.
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Part of the problem was the second devisive factor
within the military. In keeping with Nasir's policy of
upgrading the educational level of the armed forces, 70,000
students had now been inducted. Thus, civilian politics
were introduced. The younger officers were becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with their career status. (103:148)
Sadiq had sided with these elements, and his dismissal
infuriated them.
With the dismissal of Sadiq, pressure for action from
within the military began to come from Chief of Staff Shazli.
Because of this pressure and continuing joblessness and
student riots, Sadat feared a coup at any time. As an exam-
ple of the turmoil, General Ismail was reported by An-Nahar
in October 1973 to have tendered his resignation because of
pressure from within the military to attack immediately.
(108:151) Actually the dispute was a personal disagreement
between Ismail and Shazli. General Ismail had been picked
as Minister of War because of his lack of politics. Shazli
on the other hand had achieved his position because of his
meticulous approach and quick grasp of detail. The two men
did not like each other at all. (130:185)
Beneath the surface, plans for another assault were
continuing. The first training exercise for a canal crossing
had been held in 1967 under the name Liberation I. President




1. A coalition of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
2. A coalition of oil-producing states to support them.
3. Diplomatic isolation of Israel and reduction of
Israeli propaganda.
4. Neutralization of Palestine opposition to all-out
war. (108:162)
This last condition also applied to Sadat's own forces.
One of the reasons for Sadiq ' s dismissal was his insistence
on an all-out effort with sophisticated weapons. His replace-
ment, General Ismail, worked long and hard to convince his
army that the man, not the weapon, was the most critical
factor, and that there were advantages to a limited war.
(108:209)
The chief architect of the canal crossing was General
Shazli, a charismatic leader in the Patton tradition. His
preparations for what came to be called Operation Badr , and
the constant drills that he put his troops through between
1971 and 1973, were probably the reason that the crossing
was such a success. In addition, Sadat's removal of Sadiq
eliminated the major opponents to the hawks led by Shazli.
Egyptian planning for the 1973 war involved farsight
unheard of before:
1. An enormous logistics network with extensive communica-
tions was constructed, replete with secret fuel depots,
2. The main Egyptian force was to be kept under the




The air force was to be used in the ground support
role.
4. A comprehensive propaganda campaign was launched to
convince both Egyptians and westerners that Egypt's goals
were limited to recovering lost territory.
5. Egyptian forces for the first time fought for clearly
defined national, strategic, and tactical objectives.
6. Arab leadership was vastly improved. Many high-ranking
officers had been cashiered and officers of proven ability
put in their places. The gap between officers and men had
been narrowed.
7. In the period between the wars, a cadre of young
professionals had been developed who could respond to
Shazli's leadership.
8. Arab familiarization with arms and logistics had
vastly improved. (108:281)
As October 1973 approached, events were coming to a head.
The Russians were still slow to provide weapons because of
the fear that more weapons would convince the Egyptians to
open the Suez front. On the other hand, President Sadat
felt that the other Arab governments were not going to
provide more money until they saw some movement. (13 3:11)
As Sadat contemplated this dilemma, Israel continued to
settle the Sinai, the Syrian-Israeli air war increased in
intensity, and the PLO increased its guerrilla raids. How-
ever, the main impetus was once again the army. An-Nahar
reported on 5 February 197 3 the growing hostility of the
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army. It was noted that two units along the Suez front
had mutinied and that two Egyptian pilots had countermanded
orders and fought an aerial battle with Israelis. (110:5)
As Professor Amos had noted, "The decision made by Nasir
to reorganize and expand the Egyptian army had the latent
consequence of building up an organizational momentum. By
rebuilding Egyptian military capabilities and at the same
time recruiting highly politicized students, Nasir set in
motion the forces within the military which put enormous
pressure on Sadat to act." (108:321) The fall military
exercises, which usually were designed for domestic reasons,
produced an input for action. Once the military officer's
career had been locked into training for action, an irresis-
tible push was generated.
On 6 October 1973, Russian families were evacuated and
tactical missiles moved forward. Much to the surprise of
the Egyptians, the Israelis took no action. At 1405
Operation Badr was put into effect. By 1930, 80,000 men
had penetrated the Sinai to a depth of three kilometers.
The Egyptian command had expected to take up to 2 6,0 00
casualties during the crossing, but took only light losses.
(133:33) Against the advice of the Russians, who suggested
taking the passes, the Egyptian command felt that they should
maintain a solid wall on the east bank and let the Israelis
beat themselves against it.
In spite of early successes, the tide of battle turned
after the first five days. During that period the high
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command had decided on a pause to regroup. This gave the
Israelis an opportunity to put pressure on the Syrians.
On 14 October, in response to Syrian pleas, the Egyptian
forces moved out from under their air defense and attacked.
When they did, Israeli anti-tank missiles and aircraft began
to take a heavy toll. On 16 October the Israelis broke
through to the west bank at Bitter Lake and encircled the
third army. At this point a controversy developed which
has still not been solved. General Shazli, according to
Heikal, advocated withdrawing some units to fight the
Israeli bridgehead at Bitter Lake. General Ismail, however,
feared that any withdrawal would precipitate the same kind
of collapse that it did in 1967. Sadat agreed. At this
time Ismail suggested that a ceasefire was in order. On
19 October a ceasefire was arranged for the 22nd. (133:246)
During the war Egyptian discipline and morale had been
high. Even the surrounded third army showed little inclina-
tion to surrender. But why had the war occurred? Why had
the Arabs for the first time initiated the war themselves?
As Patai has concluded, the October war was an exception to
the Arab propensity for substituting words for action. In
this case there were overriding considerations. Arab honor
had been damaged, and an Arab must take revenge for loss of
honor or he is permanently dishonored. (148 :x) Heikal put
it in typically Arab terms when he stated, "The war empha-
sized the importance of the historical dimension. Today's




The operational code of the Egyptian military changed
after the "victory" of October 1973. However, the change
was not as dramatic as some might think. The victory of
Arab arms certainly gave the Egyptian military confidence.
With their honor restored, the military was more amenable
to negotiation and significantly slackened its pressure on
President Sadat to continue the war. The initial advance
of the Egyptians represented not only the first victory of
Egypt over Israel, but also the first time since the days
of the crusades that Arabs managed to gain the upper hand
in open large-scale armed conflict with a non-muslim, western-
trained and equipped army. (14 8 :ix) It might seem odd that
Egypt, including its military, considers the 1973 war a
victory, when most observers feel that by 19 October the
Israeli forces had taken command of the battlefield. How-
ever, President Sadat summed up the feelings of Egyptians
when he stated, "We have dealt Israel a blow she will never
forget, but now the U.S. is in the war against us. I
cannot order them to continue the war against the U.S."
(111:5) Consequently, the Egyptian people felt that they
had really beaten Israel. As to the results of the victory,
Patai reports, "As a result of the Arab victory, the Arabs
have rid themselves somewhat of the bitterness and self-
criticism that was the pattern from 1967-73. They have not
only become willing to negotiate with Israel, but have begun
to import western equipment to a degree that would have seemed
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impossible before the war. It is interesting that Egypt
has been credited with the victory and it is Egypt who has
led the way in negotiations. Those countries that have not
been able to chalk up a victory are opposed to all accommo-
dation." (148:11)
The victory has also had other effects. For some time
after the war, the military felt confident enough to pressure
President Sadat to restore Soviet arms shipments. (108:340)
However, it appears that the perceived inferiority of Russian
equipment and the traditional problems with arms deliveries
have continued to make the military dissatisfied.
After the war there were several changes in military
leadership. General Shazli and the commanders of the second
and third armies were dismissed. All of these officers
had been violently opposed to any negotiations or cease
fire. However, one of the reasons for the removal of Shazli
might have been to remove potential leaders of military
opposition to Sadat. (108:290) In December 1974 General
Ismail Ali died and was replaced by General Abd Al-Gamassy.
Hiekal calls General Gamassy the best equipped intellectually
to lead the Egyptian armed forces. (133:185) An indicator
of his ability, and the trust that President Sadat has for
him, is the fact that Sadat appointed him Chief-of-Staf
f
after General Shazli was dismissed. In addition, it was
General Gamassy who negotiated the ceasefire at the end of
the 1973 war. (116:574)
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However, although the military is somewhat satisfied
since 1973, it still pressures President Sadat to continue
the conflict. An-Nahar reports that during the summer of
1974 a delegation of army officers went to President Sadat
to express their concern for the weak state of the army
resulting from the arms lost in 1973, and to encourage him
to strengthen it in any way possible. It is believed that
this was the chief factor in Sadat's rapprochement with
Russia in 1974. (113:1) However, the army seems to have
a love-hate relationship with the Russians. Although they
know they need Russian arms, they harbor an intense dislike
for the Russian advisors and are disgusted with the problems
in procuring arms. The basic fact, however, is that the
military feels that the war is not over. An-Nahar also
reports that one of the reasons that Sadat wanted a solution
in the Sinai was that the military was insisting that they
could encircle and destroy Israeli units on the west bank
of the Suez. (112:1) As an example, Lt. General Muhammad
Ali Fahmi, Chief-of-Staff of the army, has stated, "Our
armed forces are in a race with time, so they must be in a
position of strength from the standpoint of organization,
training and development." (124:B1) However, even if the
Israeli question is settled, the military will still take
priority. As Patai has stated, "The October war has increased
the conflict between the moderate states led by Egypt and
the radical states headed by Syria, Libya, and the PLO.
"
(148:xii) Thus, it appears that conflict will reign in the
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Middle East, even if the Israeli question is settled. In
addition, proof that the military is still the dominant
factor in Egyptian society was provided by President Sadat
himself when he named General Husni Mubarak, Air Force




A. THE OPERATIONAL CODE METHODOLOGY
1. Leites Contribution
The concept of a construct which will allow an
analyst to discover a political actor's belief system was
originally developed by Nathan Leites in two works : The
Operational Code of the Politburo in 1951 and A Study of
Bolshevism in 1953. The first book proceeded on the theory
that, "Our awareness of Soviet strength and success has not
been matched by a knowledge of the Politburo itself."
(141 :i) Leites used two types of sources for his code:
1) the actual writings of Lenin and Stalin, and 2) the
historical record of Bolshevik reactions to certain situa-
tions. Leites' stated intention was "not to discuss the
major theories of Leninism-Stalinism, but to discover the
rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective
political conduct." (141 :xi) The book was divided into
twenty chapters with tiles such as "Predictability and
Unpredictability" and "Resistance to Attack". In A Study
of Bolshevism , Leites continued this approach, using the
writings of Lenin and Stalin and passages from Russian
literature. In this second work, he called for a full
utilization of the material he used. By full utilization
he meant, "The application of procedures now usually called
content analysis — roughly speaking, the establishment of
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frequencies of occurrence of the beliefs I shall describe."
(142:20)
2. The George Construct
Professor Alexander George's contribution to the
operational code was to critique Leites ' efforts and to
organize the code into categories that did not conflict and
overlap and that reflected the questions that a policy
analyst needed to ask.
Professor George's first contribution to the code
was his book Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences
Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II , in 1957. He
found that during World War II the FCC achieved an accuracy
of 81% in predicting Nazi activities by monitoring Nazi
propaganda broadcasts and trying to identify patterns of
reasoning. (126 :ix) He determined that, "An action schema
dealing with political decision making would have to take
into consideration the value system of the political elite,
that is, the set of values and value priorities which
determine the objectives which the elite pursue and its
choices of action from among the alternatives open to it.
It would have to take into account what has been referred
to as the operational code." (126:22)
George postulated that two methods of research could
be used to define this operational code. The direct method
involved studying the actions of the actor. The indirect
method involved studying the writings of the elite about
strategy and tactics. (126:51) However, in the final analysis
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he concluded, "The operational code, however, cannot be
safely used alone to predict or explain the actions of an
elite. For one thing, an elite may revise its general view
of correct strategy and tactics on the basis of new experi-
ences and a subsequent reevaluation of past events." (126:51)
In his article in the June 1969 International Studies
Quarterly , Professor George first discussed the work of
Nathan Leites. Although the Leites 1 work was a combination
of the operational code and a socio-psychological account
of the historical origins of Bolshevism, George believed
that the operational code part could be extracted and that,
"These beliefs implicitly or explicitly held by the political
actor can be inferred or postualted by the investigator on
the basis of the kinds of data, observational opportunities,
and methods generally available to the political scientist."
(127:193) George, like Leites, also believes that, "An
elite's fundamental beliefs about politics are probably
resistant to change for various reasons, of which unconscious
motivations are but one factor." (127:196) In his critique
of Leites, George points out that Leites did not identify
the order, hierarchy, and interrelationships among the
various elements of the code. (127:196) Consequently,
George's arrangement of the code into a set of five philo-
sophical and five instrumental beliefs is his primary con-
tribution to the operational code methodology, and the
construction used bv most researchers in the field.
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The basic code as developed by George and his appli-
cation to Leites ' research on the Bolsheviks is presented
here for two reasons. First, it presents the code as
utilized in this thesis. Second, it gives the reader an
elite group's operational code that can be compared to the
Egyptian military's code as a frame of reference.
a. Philosophical Beliefs
Philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and
premises the actor makes regarding the fundamental nature
of politics, the nature of political conflict, and the
role of the individual in history. (127:199)
1. What is the essential nature of political life?
Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or
conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's poli-
tical opponents? The Bolsheviks considered the universe
one of conflict; the fundamental question being who will
destroy whom. It came from an objective, Marxist view of
history.
2. What are the prospects for the eventual
realization of one's fundamental political values and
aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessi-
mistic on this score, and in what respect? The Bolsheviks'
position was optimistic due to the ideological premise of
the triumph of communism.
3. Is the political future predictable? In
what sense and to what extent? The Bolsheviks are of course
determinant because of their Marxist view of history.
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However, the indeterminant view dominated in many cases
because the rate of historical development was considered




How much control or mastery can one have
over historical development? What is one's role in moving
and shaping history in the desired direction? The Bolshevik
view was that dedicated, intelligent, and disciplined actors
could determine social change within fairly wide limits.
Thus the party should seize any opportunity.
5. What is the role of change in human affairs
and in historical development? The Bolsheviks felt that
there is no chance in human affairs due to the Marxist-
Leninist explanation of history. A corollary to this is
that it is not only not possible to muddle through, but
dangerous to do so. Thus, there is only one correct line
of policy.
b. Instrumental Beliefs
These are beliefs about the strategy and tactics
that should be employed in advancing one's interests.
1. What is the best approach for selecting
goals or objectives for political action? The Bolsheviks
felt that one should not set objectives by first calculating
the probability of achieving the goal or by limiting the
objectives to what can probably be attained with the means
at one's disposal. Rather, one should counter the tendency
to be conservative and try to optimize or maximize gains
as opposed to a satisficing strategy.
-7D

2. How are the goals of action pursued most
effectively? The Bolsheviks ' answer to this question was
to push to the limit, engage in pursuit once the enemy is
weakened, and know when to stop.
3. How are the risks of political action
calculated, controlled and accepted? The Bolshevik attitude
is that one can strive to achieve major objectives, such as
the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, but risks must be
minimized by minimizing means.
4
.
What is the best timing of action to advance
one's interests? The Soviets felt that they must be able
to bide their time, but they also must not let any opportunity
pass.
5. What is the utility and role of different
means for advancing one's interests? Among other views
,
the Bolsheviks feel that to be rude to the enemy might
heighten his estimate of Soviet strength and weaken mass
support for his policies.
c . Summary
In assessing the Bolshevik code, Professor George
concludes that there would be some resistance to change
because of: 1) Personal rigidities; 2) A tendency to view
problems in terms of interpretation of past history, and
also in terms of decisions that the elite has made before.
(127:220)
In later research proposals with Professor O.R.
Holsti, Professor George refined the code and called for
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further research. In the earlier article he had postulated
three constraints on the rational decision maker: 1) The
political actor's information about situations with which
he must deal is usually incomplete; 2) His knowledge of
ends-means relationships is generally inadequate to predict
reliably the consequences of a course of action; 3) It is
often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by
means of which to choose which alternative course of action
is best. (127:197) However, in assessing the uses of the
operational code, Professor George believes that the code
affects certain tasks that precede a decision, namely diag-
nosis, search, analysis, and prescription. (128:47) Thus,
the code beliefs are one of the intervening clusters of
variables that constrain decision making. He also believes
that the code has added importance in certain types of
situations: 1) Non-routine situations like wars, alliances,
etc.; 2) Decisions made by top leaders affected less by
organizational processes; 3) Long-range policy planning in
which uncertainty of the future brings out differences among
policy makers; 4) Ambiguous situations due to little informa-
tion and open to a variety of interpretations; 5) Circum-
stances of information overload where a considerable amount
of filtering is needed; 6) Unanticipated events where the
initial reaction might depend on a belief system; 7) Situations
of stress in which normal cognitive processes are impaired,




Although the use of the operational code has been
limited until recent years, there have been approximately
17 to date. The subjects include Mao-Tse-Tung, Lester
Pearson, Richard M. Nixon, Senator Frank Church, and J.
William Fullbright. These studies have tested the utility
of the code and made further suggestions. In his code of
J. William Fullbright, Dr. Kurt Tweraser found that, "The
fact that beliefs and premises are not articulated in a
systematic fashion does not necessarily mean that they are
non-existent. But it does mean that considerable inferential
leaps are necessary to bring them into the open." (152:2)
Dr. Tweraser took a qualitative approach to his research
because of the problem of imperfect data. His presentation
consisted of a running narrative describing the code inter-
spersed with historical background. In defense of his
technique he states, "It should not be forgotten that deci-
sion makers themselves tend to deal with these variables
in qualitative and sometimes incredibly imprecise terms,
and the greater precision introduced by the analyst through
quantitative techniques may not necessarily result in
greater predictive power." (152:38)
In his operational code of Senator Frank Church,
Dr. Lock Johnson also used a qualitative approach. He felt
that construction of the code required knowledge of events
during Senator Church's life such as the changing nature
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of the cold war, Vietnam, etc. Dr. Johnson also found that
Senator Church's code changed as a result of Vietnam. He
then used the code as a dependent variable influencing
subsequent behavior. Dr. Johnson concluded
, "The researcher
will still be unable to predict with confidence the precise
behavior of the subject in any specific circumstances, but
he will have an idea of the probable range of choices
acceptable to the subject in a decision situation." (138:2)
Dr. Johnson felt that the dimensions of the code form a
continuum and that the code will be dynamic. He felt that
beliefs will expand and contract in response to the psycho-
logical and situational pressures. (138:7) One of Dr.
Johnson's more important findings was the importance of
the situation preceding a decision. He stated, "...that
the point in time just before the occurrance of a political
act can provide a rich source of data for explaining the
actual behavior." (138:4)
In his research on former Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, Dr. G.G. Gutierrez found that, "It is not enough to
know about the attitudes and perceptions of decision makers
and publics. In fact, such data may be misleading, if they
are not informed by an analysis of the systematic processes
out of which these attitudes and perceptions arise and
within which they function." (129:8)
4 . Advantages of the Operational Code Methodology
In light of the research to date, the advantages of
using the operational code are:
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1. The questions in the code developed by George reduce
Leites
'
original concept to a manageable number of questions
which form a logical connection between beliefs about the
enduring features of the political universe and beliefs
about strategy and tactics necessary to achieve goals.
s 2. The answers to the questions are likely to be stable
over time.
3. The questions reflect the purposes of a policy maker's
research in that they form the beliefs which influence the
opponent's most important perceptions about conflict.
4. Over time, the methodology allows the analyst to
note changes.
This thesis incorporates many of the techniques
used by other researchers and seeks to correct some defi-
ciencies. Like Leites' original research, this thesis
concentrates on an entire group instead of one individual,
on the theory that such a code will provide a structure by
which new recruits to the Egyptian military hierarchy can
more easily be evaluated. This thesis also accepts the
findings of others that the code is dynamic and can change,
and attempts to quantify these changes.
This research proceeds on the theory that historical
background and knowledge of events are important in both
evaluation of the code and predicting future events.
An attempt is also made to correct one apparent defi-
ciency in other codes. Unlike other research in content




The material used in this study consists of 106
public statements made by Egyptian military leaders from
1955 through 1975. For purposes of this research, a
military elite is defined as a military officer who retains
his rank and whose statements are either published in
Egyptian news sources or translated by United States Govern-
ment agencies. The sources for this data are: Egyptian
Gazette , Foreign Broadcast Information Service , Joint
Publication Research Service , and one pamphlet translated
from French. Military elites were defined in this way for
several reasons: 1) Due to the usually strict censorship
of the Egyptian media, only those officers with power and
influence would be allowed to speak; 2) A problem arose in
that Egyptian officers move freely from the military to the
civilian sector. Consequently, some line must be drawn
between those who represent the military and those who are
more loyal to the civilian government. Therefore, only
those officers who retain their rank are considered to
speak for the military.
The problem of identifying military elites in
government is simplified by the fact that there are tra-
ditional posts which military officers occupy. Some of
them are: Minister of National Guidance, Minister of War,
Governor of the Suez, and Minister of the Interior. The




Appendix A depicts the speeches by year group.
There are 38 from 1955 to 1961, 27 from 1961 to June 1967,
16 from June 1967 to October 1973, and 25 from October 1973
through 1975. Although the population sample for the 1967-73
period is somewhat smaller than the others, this deficiency
is overridden by the fact that the period between the wars
is critical to evaluate in order to predict future military
attitudes.
Although there is still the question of whether
public statements reflect private beliefs, only open sources
were used in this study because the intent here is to allow
the user to continue to monitor the public statements of
Egyptian military elites and update the code. In addition,
private conversations with the subjects were not within the
scope of this project.
6 . Coding Units
Coding was accomplished by use of content analysis.
The actual structure of the code was adapted from Dr. O.R.
Holsti's Operational Code Belief Systems: A Codebook .
Dr. Holsti used the same basic structure that Professor
George originally developed, with two minor changes.
Philosophical Belief one was divided into la, lb, and lc
,
and Philosophical Belief five relating to chance was incorpo-
rated into Philosophical Belief three. The Holsti codebook
is particularly adaptive to this research in that the code-
book is much more specific in defining the code. As an
example, Philosophical Belief la is divided into seven
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subcategories. Instead of asking the question, "What is
the nature of the political universe?", the analyst asks
also, "What is the nature of conflict?, What are the condi-
tions of peace?, What are the sources of conflict?, What
is the scope of conflict?, What is the role of historical
development?, and What is the source of knowledge for this
belief?" Within each subcategory there are typologies of
responses which allow the coder to determine approximately
what type of answers he is looking for. For instance, in
asking, "What is the nature of conflict?", the coder is
trying to determine if the actor considers the world:
1) conflictual; 2) harmonious; 3) mixed; 4) something other
than one of these types. This format has several advantages
for the researcher. It permits an analyst not familiar with
the more complex aspects of content analysis to accomplish
an operational code in depth by giving specific instructions
and typologies of responses that give a frame of reference
for possible answers. The code also provides for beliefs
outside any of these typologies. Because instructions are
so specific, a wider range of material can be covered by
using a number of coders, the theory being that the codebook
prevents widely skewed and largely intuitive results when
using a large number of coders. The typologies of responses
also allow the code to be more easily quantified. And
lastly, but most importantly, the codebook reflects the
purposes of the military and political analyst.
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Because content analysis is used to construct this
code, the rules of content analysis are reviewed here. In
content analysis, the information must be fitted into:
a. Categories
Holsti states that categories for each content
datum must be mutually exclusive. The 53 separate categories
were selected from George's construct and Holsti' s codebook
to structure the answers to the code. In selecting the
categories and possible answers, this thesis departs from
many studies which draw the themes from the material wherever
they occur and whatever they happen to be. This approach
has the advantage of discouraging intuitive guesses about
the material and permits the same structure to be used
on two actors or groups of actors and the results compared.
b. Units
Common units are single words, themes, charac-
ters, sentences and paragraphs. Themes are the most used
units in research on propaganda, values, attitudes, and
beliefs. The thematic units in this thesis were also pre-
determined from the typologies of responses presented by
Holsti. As an example, in searching for the actor's concept
of the political universe, possible answers (or themes) are:
conflictual, harmonious, mixed, or seme other form. These
are the themes for which the coder searches.
Another problem is using the operational code is
establishing a linkage between the code and the information
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processing system of the actor. (150:24) The methodology
of this thesis is to select the types of themes or responses
which will affect the cognitive processes of an actor, and
then see if these themes are present in the material. For
instance, an actor who sees the political universe as con-
flictual will probably interpret most political situations
as a crisis.
c. Unit of Enumeration
The unit of enumeration for this thesis is
theme frequency. Frequency is defined as the total number
of times the theme appears within each time frame (1955-61,
etc.). This method allows changes in frequency to be noted.
Professor Holsti points out the pitfalls of using frequency
as a unit of enumeration. He states that frequency may
prove insufficient because, "It fails to take intensity
into account. " Is the item on the front page of the book?
Measuring intensity requires coders to take on one additional
judgment. (134:123) This problem occurred during analysis
of Instrumental Belief three, concerning risk. In this case
there were several important documents concerning the
Egyptian army during the 1973 war which seemed to indicate
how military leaders really felt about risk. The writer
made an intuitive judgment about the content of Instrumental
Belief three based on the intensity of these few documents.
7 . System, Generality, Reliability, Validity
a. System
The system in this thesis involves sampling
material over a twenty year period concerning a variety of
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subjects. This eliminates systematic errors that might
occur if a specific period were used. As Professor Holsti
notes, a random error will be cancelled out by using this
method. (151:134)
b. Generality
Generality requires that the results be theor-
etically relevant. In this case, the code is combined with




Reliability requires that "repeated measures
with the same instrument on a given sample of data should
yield similar results." (134:151) In this study ten coders
were chosen: four had knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs;
three were National Security Affairs students but were
specialists in other areas; and three were Naval Postgraduate
School students in other curricula. All ten coders were
asked to read a series of four paragraphs taken at random
from the material. After each paragraph, a belief category
was described which related to the paragraph. Themes or
types of responses were then described and each encoder
was then asked to mark which themes, if any, were present
in the paragraph. In this test the ten encoders agreed
50% to 80% of the time over the four categories. The
average was 67.5% In comparing the results of the test with
the findings of the writer, it was found that the majority
view of the ten encoders agreed with the analyst in three
81

of the four categories. The reliability test and specific
results are described in Appendix B.
d. Validity
Validity in this thesis is concurrent. That




As discussed earlier, constructing the operational code
has been greatly facilitated by the typologies developed
by Professor O.R. Holsti in his code book. Prior to each
part of the analysis, typologies will be presented to give
the reader a frame of reference for the results. Numbers
represent the numbers of references in the material which
applied to the category. It was possible to find more than
one reference in some cases. Numbers in parentheses
represent the percentage of references which applied to
the category being analyzed. As an example, in Table 1,
97% of all references to a political universe or the
international system from 1955 to 1961 described the system
as conflictual.
A. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
1(a). What Is The Essential Nature of the Political
Universe ? By asking this question we are attempting to
discover the actor's more enduring beliefs about politics,
history, social life, etc.
a. What is the nature of the political universe?
The actor may believe that the universe is: 1) conflictual;
2) harmonious; 3) a mix of the two; 4) his beliefs might




1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 CONFLICTUAL 96(97) 18(100) 12(100) 19(98)
2 HARMONIOUS 1(1) 1(2)
3 MIXED 1(1)
4 OTHER
Over the years the Egyptian elite has been
consistent in its view of the political universe as con-
flictual. General Amer refers to a world "rent by troubles
and tensions." (1:2) In fact, there are frequent references
to "the struggle" in describing the pursuit of goals. (2:2)
Major Salem, Minister of National Guidance in the first
years of Nasir's rule, and an original member of the Revo-
lutionary Command Council, talks about "our former calamities,
disasters, and agonies" in recounting Egypt's contact with
the west. (5:1) In later years there is reference to the
belief that, "The road is long and arduous." (45:2) Vice
Admiral Fuad refers to "a journey of battles" in 1974.
(99:6) Two phenomena should be noted here. Firstly, the
military saw the international system as conflictual through-
out the period of analysis, regardless of the situation at
any given time. Secondly, the system is seen as conflictual
even after the 1973 war, when Egypt's victory might be
expected to mellow them somewhat.
b. What are the sources of conflict? The actor
might consider the sources of conflict to be : 1) human
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nature; 2) attributes of a particular state or group of
states such as ideology, politics, or economic situation;
3) attributes of the international system like ideology,
colonialism, economics, or power politics (alliances, arms
races, security needs, etc.)
TABLE 2
1955-61 61-67 67-73 73-75
1 HUMAN NATURE 1(2) 1(2)
2 STATES 15(48) 10(45) 10(81) 17(98)
a. IDEOLOGY 4(14) 3(15) 2(18)
b. POLITICS 6(20) 6(30) 8(64) 17(98)
c. ECONOMICS 2(4)
d. OTHER 3(10) 1(5)
3 INT SYS 16(50) 11(55) 2(19)
a. IDEOLOGY
b. COLONIALISM 12(39) 11(55) 2(19)
C. ECONOMICS 3(7)
d. POWER POL 2(4)
In the period from 1955 to 1961 the percentages
indicate a fairly even split between nations and the inter-
national system as sources of conflict. In the early years
imperialism was the main source of conflict, and alliances
with imperialists were seen as "an alliance between the
strong and the weak, which was but a kind of domination in
a new form." (4:2) Imperialism was interchangeable with
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"developed countries" and "neo-colonialists"
. (53:4)
However, as the figures indicate, the term imperialism was
dropped at times and specific states like Britain and France
were singled out. There are two aspects to this early
period. First, America maintained an uncertain status. As
Nasir said, "With regard to America's stand, I do not know
what America's stand is." (13:A9) Secondly, Israel was not
singled out as one of the chief sources of conflict until
1961. Zionism was first mentioned in 1960 when Major Kamal
ad-din Husayn referred to "the aggressive forces of
imperialism and Zionism." (31:B20)
From 1961 to 1967 the trend was for Zionism to
be mentioned more often and for the United States to come
into focus as one of the chief sources of conflict. At
first the problem was seen as an alliance between imperial-
ists and Israel, e.g. "Israel, which derives its existence
and viability from imperialism, is an imperialist base
threatening freedom." (41:B2) However, from 1967 to 1973
the U.S. -Israeli connection was made, e.g., "The American-
made weapons which pour into Israel will not frighten us."
(78:16) Between 1967 and 1973 the spectre of Israeli aggression
was also mentioned frequently as the chief source of con-
flict. As General Ismail stated, "The conflict between us
and Israel is a cultural confrontation." (77:22) Consequently,
the pattern of Israeli aggression, backed by American weapons,
emerged most clearly in the 1967-73 period and has stabilized
in the 1973-75 period. The other trend in the 1973-75 period
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is that the Zionist movement as distinct from the Israeli
government has become more frequently mentioned as the most
important source of conflict.
One trend running through the entire analysis
is evident in the "other" category. Since this category
represents references to nations as sources of conflict
without any specifics as to why, it is obvious that over
the years the military seems to have become more specific
in identifying the enemy.
c. What are the conditions of peace? The actor
may believe that peace depends on: 1) better education or
information; 2) eliminating one nation or group of nations;
3) eliminating inequalities in resources, standards of
living, etc.; 4) maintaining a balance of power in the world
by containing expansionist desires, returning to the status
quo, forming blocs, etc.; 5) transforming the international
system itself through some form of world government.
TABLE 3
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 EDUCATION 2(7) 1(6)
2 ELIMINATING A STATE 9(53) 2(13)
3 INEQUALITIES 2(7)
4 BALANCE OF POWER 11(66) 6(40) 10(87) 15(88)
5 TRANSFORM SYSTEM 3(14) 1(6)
6 OTHER 1(5) 1(7)
Note: Only references to the impact of eliminating a nation
on the international system are included in this category.

As the table indicates, the military elite
basically believes in the balance of power concept for
maintaining peace. The only period when this was not true
was the period leading up to the 1967 war when the condition
of peace was to "erase the myth of Israel." (65:1) However,
there have been variations in this balance of power concept.
At first it was necessary to "purge our land of the occupier
and usurper." (7:1) The occupier was referred to as the
imperialist, capitalist, of the "free world". Other pros-
pects for peace lay in Arab unity and the formation of a
third bloc to compete with the east and west blocs. (9:A7)
From 1961 to 1967 this balance of power concept included
"supporting liberation movements for world peace." (58:4)
In the period from 19 67 to 19 73 the balance of power concept
involved a change from eliminating Israel to "liberating
every last inch of our land". (80:11) Remember that the
difference between balance of power and eliminating a nation
for purposes of this research is the difference between
destroying an actor, as opposed to driving him back and
containing his expansionist tendencies.
Since 1973 this balance of power concept has
continued. As General Mubarak said, "Our primary interest
is to maintain the international balance." (107 :D6) However,
there is one important factor in Egyptian military thinking
that must be considered in assessing this balance of power
concept. Throughout the period of analysis, the military
has felt that the only way to achieve peace if through force.
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As General Amer said, "We are now preparing to use the
language of force to establish peace." (1:2) In 1975
General Gamassy stated to the army, "With your arms you will
put an end to its (Israel) expansionist ambitions." (105:D22)
Consequently, in containing Israel and taking back its
territory, the Egyptian military may still feel that Israel
must be destroyed or incapacitated in order to contain her.
d. What is the nature of conflict? In this category
we are trying to determine whether the actor considers poli-
tical interaction: 1) zero-sum. That is, the stakes in
the political game are fixed and a loss for one side is an
equal political gain for the other side; 2) non-zero sum.
The stakes are flexible and there are instances in which
cooperation will benefit all parties. In addition, a loss
by one party might result in a much larger gain for the
other party; 3) mixed. The nature of the conflict depends
on the situation.
TABLE 4
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 ZERO-SUM 11(59) 10(83) 8(80) 11(72)
2 NON ZERO-SUM 5(21) 1(17) 5(28)
3 MIXED 4(20) 2(20) 2(20)
4 OTHER
As might be expected, the Egyptian military has
consistently seen political action as zero-sum. There are
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continuous references to "the strong and the weak". (4:2)
As an example of the absolutes involved, Colonel Sadat,
now President, writing in Al-Jumhuriyya in 1956 said, "The
formation of a third world bloc is a knockout blow to the
vestiges of imperialism which is staggering today." (9:A7)
Needless to say, the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been
seen as zero-sum. The percentages for non-zero-sum reflect
the Egyptian belief in the benefits of Arab unity. Although
the concept of the Arab-Israeli conflict as zero-sum has
never changed, the concept of the international system has
changed in recent years. In 1975 General Gamassy stated,
"The American intervention to achieve peace does not mean
ruling out a Soviet role toward this end." (10 7 :D6) It
would appear that the concept of mutual cooperation between
competitors for the gain of all is beginning to creep into
Egyptian military thought. Therefore the nature of conflict
seems to depend on the actors, not the situation.
e. What is the scope of conflict? An actor may
see issues as: 1) linked. That is, each issue is part of
a larger or more fundamental conflict; 2) spillover. Each
issue is separate but has a high potential for spillover
either from one issue to another or from one geographical




1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 LINKED 10(46) 13(80) 10(100) 7(50)
2 SPILLOVER 2(54) 4(20) 5(33)
3 SEPARATE 3(17)
Egyptian military elites tend to see issues as
either linked or having a great effect on each other. In
many cases all issues are linked to "the historic struggle".
(31:B19) Over the years this struggle has included the
fight against the imperialists, Israelis, royalists in Yemen,
and economic chaos on the home front.
In the early years, issues were considered to
have considerable geographic spillover. Egypt was the
center of both Africa and Asia, and as such anything that
happened to her affected these areas. Col. Nasir said,
"He who attacks Egypt attacks the entire Arab nation."
(13:A10) Col. Sadat said, "Our revolution has now proved
that it is no longer a local one." (22:B4) As for Israel,
the National Defense and Security Committee stated in 1967,
"Israel is also a threat to the security of the region and
the peace of the world." (71:6) This search for some kind
of linkage or at least spillover can even be seen in state
planning, e.g., "The Arab revolution is capable of bringing
about total revolution in all fields." (58:1) These linkages
are strongest when military elites talk about war. All wars
are seen as a natural extension of the revolution, e.g.,
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"The October War was a landmark in the history of our
struggle." (97:D6)
The important trend in this category is an
increase in references to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a
separate issue apart from other international issues after
the 1973 war. (95:12) Unfortunately, this was expressed
as a belief that the conflict must be solved militarily
and could not be part of some larger international debate
or settlement. During the 1973-75 period however, these
references only amounted to 17% of the total. Therefore,
this feeling that the conflict is a special issue has still
not gained much momentum.
f. What is the role of conflict: This category
explores the actor's feelings about whether conflict is:
1) necessary. That is, conflict is indispensable for the
achievement of goals: 2) functional. Conflict is costly
and distasteful, but helpful in achieving goals; 3) dys-
functional. Conflict stands in the way of achieving goals.
TABLE 6
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 NECESSARY 9(27) 4(17) 12(77) 8(36)
2 FUNCTIONAL 9(27) 3(13) 6(22)
3 DYSFUNCTIONAL 15(46) 7(33) 3(23) 8(36)
The Egyptian military throughout the period has
seen the value of conflict in developing the armed forces.
As Lt. General Aly Gamal said in 1963, "I am fully confident
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that you have acquired adequate experience in combat,
making you now fully prepared and ready..." (51:2) The
only difference of opinion among officers has been whether
conflict was indispensable (necessary category) or basically
costly but helpful (functional). As the figures indicate,
battle was considered indispensable between the wars, but
returned to a more equal distribution between necessary and
functional after the war. As an example of the philosophy
that conflict is necessary, in 1963 General Amer said,
"Conflict is part of life itself." (44:1) In 1975 General
Gamassy said, "It requires effort, sweat, and blood to
preserve our past with all our heritage and glory." (105:D22)
The percentages in the dysfunctional category
reflect the view that Egypt might be a casualty of the cold
war between the United States and Russia. As Colonel Sadat
said, "We do not want the cold war, we want true peace."
(9:A6) This feeling was responsible for Egypt's adopting
the philosophy of positive neutrality during the early years.
(19:B4) Needless to say, conflict between Arab states is
seen as dysfunctional.
1(b). What is the Fundamental Character of One's
Political Opponents and of Other Significant Political Actors?
a. What are the opponents' goals? Is the opponent:
1) destructionist. The opponent has unlimited goals such as
universal hegemony or radical transformation of the existing
international system; 2) expansionist. The opponent is
aggressive but his goals fall short of destruction;
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3) defensive. The opponent is chiefly concerned with
security or maintenance of the status quo; 4) conciliatory.
The opponent is ready to undertake at least limited accommo-
dation; 5) active seeker of peace. The opponent is prepared
to undertake major peace initiatives.
TABLE 7
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 DESTRUCTIONIST 6(30) 9(40) 5(45)
2 EXPANSIONIST 6(30) 4(20) 4(36) 6(30)
3 DEFENSIVE 3(13) 3(40)
4 CONCILIATORY
5 SEEKER OF PEACE
6 OTHER 5(27) 9(40) 1(19) 6(30)
Analysis in this category indicates that the
military is somewhat divided in its perception of the goals
of the enemy, and in many cases is very vague and unsure.
Although the imperialists were seen as destructive at times
like the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, in many instances, they
were seen as what could be termed exploitive. (13:Al) This
belief is represented in the other category. It was felt
that the imperialists wanted to hold Egypt back, to hinder
its progress, to keep it from leading the Arab revolution,
e.g., "The objective and aim of the aggression against Egypt
was to rob it of its rights, to prejudice its independence,
and to destroy the whole of Arab nationalism by doing so."
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(17:A25) However, exactly what Egypt's enemies wanted
(destruction, territorial expansion, security, etc.) was
uncertain.
The conflict with Israel is somewhat sharper,
and there appears to be a trend. At first Israel is seen
as expansionist. (27:B2) However, between the wars the
intensity of feeling if evident in the fact that Israel is
seen as bent on destruction, e.g. , "The next war will not be
restricted only to military operations, it will be a total
war." (76:55) Following the war there appears to be a
change in perception. Although General Ismail and others
frequently refer to the "expansionist desires of Israel"
(94:D7), many more references to Israel's security goals
begin to appear. The "Israeli theory of security", a term
describing Israel's quest for secure buffer zones in the
Sinai and Golan Heights, is seen as Israel's chief goal.
(96:1)
b. What are the sources of the opponent's goals?
Is the opponent driven by its own characteristics such as
ideology, historical goals, internal needs, leadership traits;
or is he driven by external forces like traditional power
politics or external pressures or policies of others?
TABLE 8
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 IDEOLOGY 3(15) 3(27) 5(43)
2 HISTORIC GOALS 10(70) 7(73) 5(43) 9(40)









As the figures indicate, the military believes
basically that some internal force drives its opponents,
but what the motivation is is extremely hard to derive.
There are many references to the aims of the opponent but
few to the opponents' source of motivation. The motivation
assigned to most opponents, especially the imperialists, is
a basic historical interest in domination of the Arabs, e.g.,
"The enemies of the Arab revolution among the forces of
imperialism and neo-colonialism know that the striking down
of Egypt is the target which would enable them to realize
their ambition to gain control of all Arab lands." (53:4)
In most cases the motivation is economic, not ideological,
e.g., "The battle was one between spiritual and material
values." (7:1)
However, between the wars ideology did come in
for more criticism. This was usually in reference to
Zionism, e.g., "We are in fact convinced that the Zionist
movement, which wants to bring back to Israel the Jews
who are spread all over the world, is basically aggressive
96

and expansionist." (73:69) After the 1973 war the trend
abruptly reversed. Reflecting a more pragmatic view, the
military becomes more interested in the internal needs of its
enemies. As mentioned above, the Israeli thoery of security
became more prominent. In addition, there is more reference
to the internal needs of the superpowers. Russia's "interests
in the Mediterranean" are seen as the result of security
needs. (107 :D7) As for America, "America, as the leader
of imperialism, wants to keep us away from the Soviet Union
and wants to keep the Soviet Union away from the region
because of the oil." (82:20)
c. What is the generality of the adversary's
hostility or opposition? Does the actor believe that:
1) the opponent's hostility is all encompassing and long
term, or does the actor believe that; 2) the conflict is
shaped by a specific issue which, if solved, could lead
to normal relations.
TABLE 9
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 GENERAL/PERMANENT 22(80) 11(100) 6(85) 6(75)
2 SPECIFIC/LIMITED 4(20) 1(15) 2(25)
3 OTHER
Obviously, the Egyptian military sees the con-
flict with all opponents as permanent and of an all-encompassing
nature, e.g., "Our enemies, the imperialists, are today
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plotting as they did in the past." (22:B4) Throughout the
period there are references to the belief that "the battle
is continuous." (77:24) There is one trend , however. The
impression is given that the source of conflict is the
specific issue of the Israeli security theory in the
1973-75 period. Although this issue is considered all
encompassing in many cases, there are some references to
the belief that peace centers on this Israeli theory of
security.
d. What is the likely response of the adversary
to our conciliatory moves? Will the opponent: 1) recipro-
cate in this situation; 2) reciprocate in other situations;
3) ignore; 4) take advantage in this situation; 5) take
advantage in other situations.
TABLE 10









IN OTHER SIT. 12(75) 6(100) 7(85) 6(60)
The Egyptian military, like other military
elites throughout the world, feels that any attempt at
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conciliation will be either ignored or taken advantage of
in other areas. This is another example of the military
elite's propensity for finding linkages between issues.
As General Amer said, "Should we ever align ourselves, we
would be giving away part of our independence." (11:B4)
General Ismail Ali echoed these sentiments in speaking
about Egypt's decision to attack in October 1973. "If
we did not begin the fighting, the enemy would." (85:17)
Note that this feeling did not change after the war.
e. What will the opponent's response be to a
policy of firmness? Will the opponent: 1) back down and
concede important points; 2) ignore the firm policy and
proceed with his own timetable; 3) reciprocate in this
situation with his own hard line; 4) reciprocate in other
situations; 5) respond impulsively.
TABLE 11
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 BACKDOWN 15(93) 10(100) 5(34) 12(80)










The Egyptian military still maintains the tra-
ditional Arab belief that a policy of firmness or show of
force will cause the enemy to back down. The best deterrent
is a strong army. "The UAR armed forces realize that they
are the greatest dissuasive force possessed by the compre-
hensive Arab struggle." (53:4) Note that between the wars
the belief grew that the Israelis were ignoring Egypt's firm
stand and were proceeding with their own timetable. This
was indicated by references to the fact that "force was the
only means". (83:3) After the war the belief that the
opponent could be backed down reappeared, e.g. "If we can
succesfully challenge the Israeli security theory, then
that will lead to certain results in the short and long
term." (96:2)
f. What is the opponent's image of one's own
nation? Does the opponent consider Egypt: 1) destructionist
;
2) expansionist; 3) defensive; 4) conciliatory; 5) an active
seeker of peace.
TABLE 12
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 DESTRUCTIONIST 1(5)





6 OTHER 13(62) 6(60) 3(50)
100

There were also few references to the opponent's
image of Egypt. Although there were numerous references in
the early years, they tapered off as time went on. Note
that there were no references after the 197 3 war.
In the early years it was believed that the
imperialists thought Egypt was weak and backward. Their
references were entered in the "other" category. Note
that there are consistent references to this until after
the 1973 war, e.g., "Our enemies used to say that we could
not rely on ourselves." (25:B3) Along with this, there
were occasional references to the belief that the enemy
regarded Egypt as Egypt regarded the enemy, i.e., expansionist
"They fear that the wave of progress will spread to their
country." (40:B5) However, one of the strongest statements
about the opponent's view of Egypt came from General Ismail
in October 1972, when he told his men, "You should know
that we are facing an enemy that sets little store by us,
thinking we are not capable of fighting." (82:21) The fact
that such a statement occurred before the war and that
there were no references after the war seems to indicate
either a decreasing concern or awareness of the enemy's
images.
g. What is the opponent's view of conflict? Is
conflict: 1) inevitable, or can it be avoided; 2) is




1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 INEVITABLE 4(100) 4(100) 6(100) 6(100)
AVOIDABLE
2 DESIRABLE 10(90) 8(100) 10(100) 6(100)
UNDESIRABLE 1(10)
The military has held consistently throughout
the years that their opponents consider conflict inevitable
and desirable for the achievement of goals. As for the
imperialists, "They have created Israel in order to secure
a hostile base with intentions similar to theirs." (60:18)
As for Israel, "Israeli policy is built on aggression."
(41:B2)
h. What are the opponent's decision-making
processes? Is the opponent: 1) a unitary actor (Model
I); 2) an actor whose policies are the result of bureau-
cratic inertia and thus possesses a certain continuity over
time regardless of leadership (Model II); 3) an opponent
with competing groups within its nation. Are there




1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1974-75
1 MODEL I 20(80) 10(91) 7(77) 8(66)
2 MODEL II
3 MODEL III 5(20) 1(9) 2(23) 4(34)
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The military has typically seen the opponent,
whether it be one nation or a group of nations, as a mono-
lithic unit. Most references are to the "free world",
the imperialists, or the developed nations. (15:A2) Israel
is treated in the same manner. However, starting before
the 1973 war and increasingly thereafter, the trend has
been toward a Model III analysis. Opponents are perceived
to be a mixture of competing groups and interests. In
discussing supposed United States intervention in the 1973
war, General Shazli states that, "The logic is with Kissinger."
(92:3) The Zionist movement, instead of just Israel, has
come in for more criticism. (73:69) As for Israel, "Most
of the Israeli prisoners were captives of Israeli domestic
propaganda. They have lost confidence in their political
parties." (94:D9)
i. What is the opponent's approach to choosing
objectives? This category and the next attempt to define
the opponent's operational code as seen by the Egyptian
military. 1) is the opponent an optimizer or a satisficer.
Does he pursue the best goal or will he be satisfied with
a goal that is attainable under the circumstances; 2) are
the opponent's goals realistic or unrealistic; 3) is the





1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 OPTIMIZE 9(70) 4(75) 2(50) 3(75)
2 SATISFY 4(30) 1(25) 2(50) 1(25)
3 REALISTIC 1(33) 2(50)
4 UNREALISTIC 2(67) 2(100) 2(50)
5 FLEXIBLE 2(25) 2(100)
6 INFLEXIBLE 6(75) 3(100)
7 PREDICTABLE 7(70) 2(100) 3(75)
8 UNPREDICTABLE 3(30) 1(25)
There were very few concrete results in this
category. Military spokesmen seem to be divided on the
opponent's operational code. This low perception of enemy
methods and intentions has been consistent throughout the
analysis. However, a few beliefs are consistent. Most
opponents are perceived as using an optimizing strategy.
As noted in other categories, the military felt that the
imperialists were bent on total domination of everything
Arabic. As for Israel, Israel was believed to "rampage in
the region without fear of being repelled or punished."
(82:21) The enemy's goals were usually seen as unrealistic,
e.g., "The proposal (to internationalize the canal) is
foolish and mad." (12:A1) The enemy's pursuit of objectives
was seen as predictable. However, there was a change in
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perception of Israel after the 1973 war. Between the wars
the Israeli flexibility in changing strategy and tactics was
highly regarded, e.g., "He was not able to strike any of
our targets and affect the operation of our air defense
system, and this caused him to revise his mode of operation
and the tactics of his air force." (80:11) However, after
the war Egypt's military success led to a lower opinion
of Israel, who was seen as basically inflexible in terms
of strategy. As General Ismail stated after the war, "As
a result (of a wide attack along the canal) the enemy
would be slow in making any effective counter-attack on
the ground. " (85:17)
j. How does the opponent pursue objectives? Does
the opponent 1) prepare ground by making very careful
preparations; 2) try and see. That is, the opponent takes
action as a way of testing what is feasible. It is not
necessary to determine in advance what the outcome will
be; 3) incremental approach. The opponent emphasizes the
value of limited gains; 4) blitzkrieg strategy. The opponent
commits a major portion of his resources and a full scale
effort to the achievement of goals.
TABLE 16
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 PREPARE
GROUND
2 TRY & SEE
3 INCREMENTAL 9(60) 6(100) 3(37)
4 BLITZKRIEG 6(40) 5(63) 5(100)
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The results in this category do not show any-
consistent trends because perceptions are dependent on the
opponent in question. The imperialists are usually regarded
as employing an incremental or piece meal approach. For
instance, they are trying to exploit Arab disunity in
order to "establish their foothold and consequently dominate
us." (28:B5) There are also constant references to plotting
and conspiracies to gain a foothold. (38:B8) On the other
hand, Israel is believed to employ the allout blitzkrieg
strategy. They were accused of "launching a horrible war."
(19:B5) They were also accused of "violating everything
as never before." (78:15)
k. How does the opponent cope with risk? Does
the opponent seek to maximize gains or minimize losses?
TABLE 17
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 MAXIMIZE GAINS 7(54) 4(100) 2(33)
2 MINIMIZE LOSSES 6(46) 4(100) 4(67)
The results of this category basically reflect
a growing awareness by Egypt that Israeli manpower is
limited. The 100% for the 1961-67 period reflect the
belief that Israel would do anything for territorial expan-
sion. However, after the 1967 war, Egyptian military leaders
began to formulate their plans on the basis of Israel's
need to minimize the loss of their limited resources. They
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stated, "The enemy has built the Bar' -Lev line to give
confidence to his troops." (83:13) As for the breach at
Deversoir, "The enemy was compelled to withdraw from the
bulge because he was certain that the situation was not
in his favor." (94:D8)
1(c). What is the Nature of the Contemporary
International System?
a. What is the structure of the present system? Is
the world polarized into two centers of power with rela-
tively rigid and antagonistic policies, or is it a plural-
istic world with several centers of power and more flexible
alignments?
TABLE 18
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 POLARIZED 7(100) 4(100) 2(100) 6(100)
2 PLURALISTIC
Although the Egyptian military throughout the
years has loudly proclaimed, "The future of the world is
no longer determined by one or two states," (9:A6) it
becomes obvious that they see the world as polarized.
Colonel Sadat once said, "East is east and west is west
and never the twain shall meet. Kipling was right." (9:A5)
Thus although Egypt sees the world as polarized, they have
steadfastly refused to join either bloc, e.g., "Our positive
neutr competiton between big blocs in inter-
national society. It is not a bargaining with the best
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bloc." (9:A6) Throughout the years military leaders talk
in terms of big power confrontation. (82:20) In addition,
Egypt has always sought to loosen this system by forming
a power base of third world countries, e.g., "The third
world bloc has actually and factually been formed." (9:A7)
Even in recent times, although military leaders have tried
to stay neutral, they still work within the framework of a
polar world. General Mubarak viewed the world as possessing
two centers of power when he said, "An American intervention
to achieve peace does not rule out a Soviet role toward
this end." (105:D22)
P2 . What Are the Prospects for the Eventual Realization
of One's Fundamental Political Values and Aspirations?
a. What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?
Are one's goals: 1) destructionist . The actor's goals are
unlimited, including universal hegemony; 2) expansionist.
The actor is active in the pursuit of his interests, but
his goals fall short of total destruction and do not include
transformation of the international system; 3) defensive.
The actor is primarily concerned with security and main-
tenance of the status quo. His quest for security may
infringe on another's sovereignty and could even lead to
destroying part of the opponent's nation. His concept of
the status quo may also be open to question; 4) conciliatory
The actor desires at least limited accommodation; 5) active





1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 DESTRUCTIONIST 2(13) 2(28)
2 EXPANSIONIST 6(18) 2(13)





Although the military has seen itself in a
defensive role consistently, it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between their defensive posture and an expan-
sionist attitude. At first General Amer was able to say
that Egypt's goal was "the imposition of peace unto the
frontiers of Egypt and the protection of liberty and jus-
tice. We aspire to perfect security." (1:1) However,
later on as Egypt assumed leadership in the Arab world,
this defensive attitude became more aggressive, e.g., "Today
our armed forces march everywhere to safeguard the princi-
ples and objectives of Arab nationalism," (46:5) and "We
support liberation movements in the wide Arab homeland."
(50:1) Prior to 1967 this defensive attitude became
destructionist with regard to Israel. The military spoke
of "eliminating Israel" (42:1) and "erasing the myth of
Israel." (64:9) However, the military still felt that this
was necessary to defend Egyptian territory. Throughout the
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period the goal remained security and defense of the status
quo. When Egypt realized that they had been mistaken in
their policy of destruction of Israel and that the better
course was one of containment, their stated policy became
even more a classic defensive strategy as defined for the
purposes of the research. As General Sadiq said, "We are
determined to liberate our land which has been soiled by
the enemy." (73:43) However, the important point here is
that the Egyptian strategy may have changed from destruction
to containment, but the underlying goal as perceived by the
military has always been defense of Egyptian security.
b. Should one be optimistic or pessimistic about
the achievement of goals? Is the actor optimistic or
pessimistic about the pursuit of goals? If he is opti-
mistic, is this optimism qualified? Or does he express
this optimism in the pursuit of some goals and pessimism
in the pursuit of others?
TABLE 20
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 OPTIMISTIC
UNQUALIFIED 10(33) 5(35) 4 (66) 7(63)
2 OPTIMISTIC
QUALIFIED 12 (46) 8(58) 1(17) 4(37)
3 MIXED 3(11)
4 PESSIMISTIC 1(5) 2(7) 1(17)
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Analysis of responses in this category indi-
cates that the military has been fairly consistent in its
optimism about goals over the years. As General Amer said,
"We are completely overcoming all obstacles , most of which
we have smoothed out." (1:1) The fact that this attitude
persisted between the war years, and especially leading
up to the 1973 war, attests to Egyptian faith in the ulti-
mate "final victory." (56:1) However, at times this optimism
has been qualified, usually this qualification concerns
the "intrigues of the plotters." (13:A2) As General Amer
stated, "The Arab nation faces many threats from the enemy."
(41:B2) Pessimism usually concerns the efforts of outside
powers to intervene, e.g., "Undoubtedly the danger exists
that all that is being done at the United Nations will
turn out to be only useless wishful thinking." (72:43)
There is another aspect to this optimism that
should be noted. The military is most optimistic about
its general, long-term goals like "peace and prosperity."
(2:5) These long-range goals seem to be granted unconditional
optimism. "We are determined to achieve happiness and
protect her from any harm, whatever our sacrifice." (76:56)
Their pessimism concerns short-term policy undertaking like
Arab unity. (4:1) Any optimism concerning short-term policy
undertaking is usually conditional on some event, i.e., a
strong army, Soviet assistance, third world alignment, etc.
c. On whose side is time? Is time on one's own




1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 OWN 19(100) 4(100) 2(40) 9(100)
2 OPPONENT 3(60)
The military feels that time is on their side
in the pursuit of goals. This is part of their basic opti-
mism regarding the achievement of goals. As General Amer
said, "Our desert will bury our enemies." (1:2) General
Shazli stated after the 1973 war, "The longer the war
continued, the enemy would be forced to go on its knees."
(90:3) However, there was one period when this was not the
belief. Between the wars, opinion shifted to the belief
that time was on the opponent's side, e.g., "Because today
we are more than ever convinced that if the situation does
not develop it will worsen rapidly." (72:66) After the war
the traditional belief in the advantage of time returned.
P3. Is the Political Future Predictable? In What Sense
and to What Extent? What is the Role of Chance in Human
Affairs and History?
a. Is political life predictable? Does the actor
consider political life predictable or capricious?
TABLE 22
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 PREDICTABLE 16(90) 7(100) 5(71) 6(67)
2 CAPRICIOUS 2(10) 2(29) 3(33)
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Although the Egyptian military prefers to believe
that political life is predictable, there is another trend
that should be kept in mind. The military has traditionally
been suspicious of purely political processes and in fact
considers the use of force the most predictable way to
achieve political goals. In 1955 Colonel Sadat stated,
"International treaties and agreements will be given one
simple interpretation." (2:1) Although there is a certain
amount of predictability in this statement, it indicates
a growing dislike for this type of process. By 1974 General
Ismail said, "Our guarantee of winning this struggle either
through peace or war basically depends on our strength
and military preparedness." (96:1)
As to what aspects of political life are
predictable, historical development seems to be the most
predictable. This correlates with the military's optimism
about long term goals and belief that time is on their side.
General Amer said in 1955, "The battle that we are engaged
in will decide the sort of army we have during the ten
years to come." (1:4) In 1975 General Gammasy indicated
the same belief in the predictability of historical develop-
ment. He indicated that the October war was only "one of
the stages in the revolution." (100:13) Short term policy
outcomes are seen as somewhat less predictable, and in fact
Israel was seen as extremely unpredictable between the wars,
e.g., "We must raise the level of our readiness to face any
treacherous attempt on the part of the enemy." (73:43)
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P4. How Much Control or Mastery Can One Have Over
Historical Development?
a. What is the role of the leader? Should the
leader: 1) actively use politics to shape or guide his-
torical development; 2) intervene when feasible. . That
is , should the leader know when to intervene and when not
to? Should he know which problems are solvable and which
are not? 3) mediate between contending forces. Should the
leader be a broker? 4) discern historical trends. Should
the leader identify the main trends of historical develop-
ment and pursue policies that are in harmony with these
trends? 5) avoid intervention. Should the leader let
issues unfold at their own pace? 6) control uncertain,
but must act. Although the leader does not know whether
control of historical development is possible, he should
believe that he must act as if it is possible.
In this category military leaders surprisingly
indicated in almost 100% of the references that the leader-
ship should actively use politics to shape Egypt's progress,
Although this is a typically military philosophy, it is
surprising that the leadership did not tend toward the
more Arabic syndrome of discerning political trends and
designing policies that were in harmony with them. Most of
the beliefs in this category were framed in the context of
the army's role in leading the nation, e.g., "The army acts
the role of the advanced guard' (27:B1) and "The army is
the shield protecting the people." (35:B4) As one general
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put it, "It is possible to control the nature and the
rapidity of social changes through government planning."
(62:5) An example is President Sadat's expulsion of the
Russians in 1972. General Ismail said, "These decisions
were made by President Sadat. The president of the
republic is more intent on Egypt's interest than anyone
else ." (80:20)
b. What source of knowledge is used to provide
philosophical beliefs? Does the actor use: 1) ideology.
The actor draws on or cites a body of thought, literature,
or beliefs; 2) trends. The actor extrapolates from a
series of events such as defense budgets, GNP; 3) experi-
ence. The actor draws on his own personal experience as
proof; 4) history. The actor uses the lessons of history
or parallels between past and contemporary events; 5) specific
events. The actor generalized from a single event or a
very limited number of specific events; 6) faith. The actor
explains that the point he is making must be accepted on faith,
TABLE 23
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 IDEOLOGY 4(3) 1(2) 1(2)
2 TRENDS 14(11) 3(9) 3(13) 1(14)
3 EXPERIENCE 4(3) 3(9) 5(13) 5(14)
4 HISTORY 37(31) 15(46) 6(16) 3(26)
5 SPECIFIC EVENTS 50(43) 10(31) 18(51) 16(46)
6 FAITH 10(8) 1(5) 4(10) 3(8)
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There are two factors to be noted in this
category. First, the most frequent source of knowledge or
proof about philosophical issues is the generalization about
some specific event, e.g., "Proof that Israel's allegations
are false are the decisions given by the truce committee
in similar incidents." (8:1) The military forms a concep-
tion of the results of an event and then uses this conception
as proof of their philosophy. From 1961-67 the Yemini war
was used in this way. (45:1) From 1967-73 it was the 1967
war. (77:18-19) Since 1973 it has been the October war.
(90:3) The second most-used source is the use of historical
parallels, e.g., "History does not ordain it alone, but
ordains it with sacrifice and fire and violent battle."
(76:16) There are also frequent references to the history
of the struggle and "Egypt's traditional position". (1:2)
The second aspect of this category is the fact
that ideology is used surprisingly little. In all 106
speeches there was only one reference to the philosophy of
Nasir, that by General Shazli. (78:8-12)
B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
In the instrumental phase of the code we are interested
in the more pragmatic issues of strategy and tactics and
the best methods to achieve goals.
II. What is the Best Approach for Selecting Goals or
Objectives of Political Action?
a. How should one establish goals or political
action? Should the actor use: 1) a comprehensive framework

or master plan; 2) a mixed strategy of the comprehensive
and individual approaches depending on the circumstances;
3) individual issues. The actor should look at the
immediate problem at hand and the opportunities afforded
by the circumstances.
TABLE 24
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 COMPREHENSIVE
FRAMEWORK 13(100) 6(100) 6(86) 9(90)
2 MIXED STRATEGY
3 INDIVIDUAL ISSUES 1(14) 1(10)
The military generally has always agreed that
goals should be established within the framework of an
overall master plan. This framework at times has been
Arab unity, state planning, etc. As noted in other cate-
gories, all strategy prior to the 1967 war was contained
within the concept of eliminating Israel. After the 1967
war the strategy was switched to recovering occupied terri-
tory. Although there are references to "The waging of war
in different areas, each of which requires special tactics",
the goals themselves usually reflect the overall comprehen-
sive framework. (61:14)
b. What is the nature of the goals to be sought?
Should the actor seek goals that are: 1) optimal. That
is, should the actor stick to his fundamental goals and
avoid the risk of settling for less than one could otherwise
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achieve; 2) feasible. That is, should the actor be pre-
pared to strive for goals that advance one a limited dis-
tance toward long term goals. This theory holds that it
is permissable to divide long range goals into a series of
lesser ones; 3) mixed. That is, the actor adopts goals
depending on the issue.
TABLE 2 5
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 OPTIMAL 15(100) 4(100) 5(80) 1(15)
2 FEASIBLE 2(20) 7(85)
3 MIXED
Over the years the thinking of the military
has changed from optimal to feasible goal setting. After
the 1967 war the military changed its goal from eliminating
Israel to driving Israel from the Sinai. During the period
between the wars it appears that many generals were trying
to hold on to the optimizing strategy and simply substituted
the long range goal of expulsion for the previous goal of
elimination. This is probably due to the fact that the
impetus for the change came from President Sadat and the
military was resisting the change in goal-setting philosophy.
One of the best examples of the change to a feasible approach
was General Ismail's speech to his men in November 1972
when he stated that the goal was "expulsion if possible,
annihilation if he refuses to leave." (80:21) This also
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represents a good example of the transition between the
two philosophies. Note that the original optimizing
strategy is still there. However after the 1973 war, the
change was more apparent. General Ismail stated in Novem-
ber 1973 that his mission was to "destroy the Israeli
security theory" and that this would have long-term results.
(83:20) He also stated that, "The Egyptian armed forces
achieved the political objectives of the October military
operation." (92:D7) This is in contrast to earlier years
in which General Amer had talked of "complete victory and
no less", (52:1) and final victory that will "achieve all
of our aspirations". (30:B3)
c. What are the paths to achievement of goals?
In achieving goals does the actor believe that: 1) there
is only a single path that will achieve success. To be
flexible is to compromise the possibility of achieving
success; 2) there are multiple paths to achieving goals.
Each path has a probability of success between and 100%.
TABLE 26
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 MULTIPLE 5(71)
2 SINGLE 12(100) 5(100) 4(100) 2(29)
This category also shows a change after the 1973
war. Prior to that war there was general agreement that
there was only one path to the achievement of a goal that
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could assure success. Generally it was the path of Arab
unity. "This cooperation (between Arab countries) was the
only means to put an end to our former calamities." (5:1)
There was also talk about "The path of dignity and freedom.
"
(49:1) Although at times the military spoke about accepting
multiple schools of thought in developing tactics, the end
result was always the one best way, e.g., "After reviewing
tactical methods applied in different parts of the world,
we perfected a new system of military tactics." (53:1)
However after the 1973 war, statements began to appear that
indicated the military might be beginning to accept the
multiple path approach, e.g., "Political efforts and mili-
tary efforts are proceeding along parallel lines." (101:Dl)
General Gamassy was able to say that U.S. efforts to settle
the Middle East issue did not preclude a Soviet role."
(105 :D6) He was also able to say that the Arabs should
develop an arms industry in addition to diversifying
their source of weapons. (106 :D4)
d. Are there value conflicts in the pursuit of
goals" Does the actor believe that: 1) all goals are
compatible or at least linked in such a way that the
achievement of one will insure the success of the other;
2) tradeoffs are necessary. That is, two major goals are




1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 GOALS
COMPATIBLE 20(90) 4(40) 5(100) 2(25)
2 TRADEOFFS
NECESSARY 2(10) 6(60) 9(75)
Results in this category reflect the fact that
there have been two periods in which the military has felt
that there were goal conflicts. The first was the period
following the breakdown of the UAR and the attempt at Arab
Unity. Although previously General Ali Amir, Chief-of-
Staff, had been able to speak of "one consolidated block
leaving no room for differences" (28:B3), in 1964 General
Hakim Amer, Minister of War, had to admit, "Differences
may well arise between the governments in view of the
differences in the stages of development, but the full
encounter between the people of the Arab world emanates
from the unity of their history." (52:4) This statement
also illustrates the military's method of coping with
these value conflicts. They tend to deny that they really
exist.
The second period of value conflict followed
the 197 3 war. Although all goals were seen as compatible
with "the common destiny" (79:17) leading up to the war,
speaking about tactics in retrospect, General Ismail referred
to "a plan that will guarantee the safety of our forces
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and their capability of continuing, and at the same time
come as a complete surprise to the enemy." (89:4) Most
references to goals after the war concerned this value
conflict between protecting forces and achieving victory.
12 . How Are the Goals of Action Pursued Most Effectively?
a. Under what circumstances is it permissible to
modify, substitute for, or abandon goals? The actor's
choices here are self-explanatory.
A review of the material indicates that the
military does not believe in modifying, substituting for,
or abandoning a goal once it has been established. As
General Amer stated, "What would disgrace us would be to
abandon our mission." (19:B6) The only references prior to
the 1973 war in this category concern scaling a goal up,
e.g., "Our role is no longer restricted to just protecting
the borders. Our message today is more general and compre-
hensive." (36:B29) Although the military did in fact
modify its goal of eliminating Israel and substituting the
goal of liberating occupied territory, they do not speak
of this as goal substitution. It appears that the only
situation in which a goal could be modified would be the
danger of the destruction of the armed forces. After 1973
there were references to this situation. As General Ismail
stated, "I was ready for any losses and sacrifices, but I




b. What approach should be used in the pursuit of
goals? Should the actor use: 1) prepare ground; 2) try
and see; 3) incremental approach; 4) blitzkrieg.
TABLE 2 8
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 PREPARE GROUND 17(85) 5(62) 7(70) 8(61)
2 TRY AND SEE
3 INCREMENTAL 2(16)
4 BLITZKRIEG 3(15) 2(38) 3(30) 3(23)
The military has consistently held that the
best approach to a goal is careful preparation, e.g., "We
are fully prepared." (23:B9) "Entering a battle with the
enemy requires prior preparation and coordination." (68:5)
In point of fact, their beliefs combine both the prepare
ground and blitzkrieg typologies. "The next war will not
be a war restricted only to military operations, it will
be a total war — either survival or extinction of the entire
state and all its sectors. As to when we decide to enter
the battle with the enemy, we must be fully aware that the
state has taken into account the moment that we will enter
the battle with all our might." (74:55) The military has
often touted the beneficial effects of the Yemeni war, but
they have never advocated the try and see method of entering
a war with what they consider to be an uncertain outcome
just to see if the tactics work. Until the end of the 1973
123

war they also never advocated an incremental approach with
intermediate short-term goals. However, after 1973 this
belief in incrementalism began to appear. General Ismail
said, "The immediate task was to remove the effects of six
years waiting under arms." (83:17) There were also references
to the fact that the short-term goal of challenging the
Israeli security theory might have long-term results. (94:1)
c. Under what circumstances should one push harder,
accommodate, or step back?
The military feels that in all situations the
best strategy is to push harder, e.g., "Our armed forces
will no longer turn the left cheek after the right has been
slapped." (16:A16) "Force is the only means to make Israel
return Arab territories." (81:13)
13 . How Are the Risks of Political Action Calculated,
Controlled, and Accepted?
This category was analyzed differently because the
Egyptian military seldom discusses risk in their public
statements. However, there are several important speeches,
most of which deal with the 1973 war, which indicate the
military's attitude toward risk. For this reason no chart
nor percentages are presented in this section.
a. How is risk assessed? Does the actor assess
risk in terms of: 1) a comprehensive framework. That is,
in relation to all of one's goals and aspirations, not just
the problem at hand; 2) specific undertakings. The actor
calculates risk in light of the particular policy; 3) specific
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tactics. The actor assesses risk solely in terms of tactics
As an example, in this category a bombing raid would be
assessed in terms of its probability for success or failure,
instead of in relation to over-all goals.
The Egyptian military assesses risk in relation
to the overall goals and aspirations. In other words, their
main consideration is usually what effect the success or
failure of a policy or tactic will have on their overall
goals of sovereignty, Arab unity, etc. As an example, the
decision to diversify arms is judged more in terms of its
impact on Egyptian military sovereignty than in terms of
the likelihood for eventual conversion to other sources of
supply. (87:13) In addition, the most frequent references
to risk are couched in terms of a comprehensive goal. "Our
people are aware of the dangers facing them and the stages
of the struggle which they had to go through." (36:B27)
b. What approach should be employed to limit or
control risk? Should the actor limit or scale down goals,
or should he limit means?
The military has changed its approach to con-
trolling risks since the 1973 war. Prior to that, the usual
policy was to limit means, e.g., "We must reinforce this
region with enough forces to insure its security without
prejudicing the main concentration of the nation's forces."
(78:9) However, it appears that they began to think more
in terms of limiting goals as the 1973 war approached. In
trying to convince his troops that they could fight with the
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weapons they already had, General Ismail said, "The
leadership is bent on assigning tasks to us that can be
implemented." (80:20)
c. How should one deal with various types of
tradeoffs associated with risk? Does the actor: 1) maximize
gains or minimize losses. How does the actor deal with;
2) action versus inaction; 3) immediate action versus delay.
In dealing with tradeoffs, the military at first
concentrated on maximizing gains, e.g., "We will crush
everything standing in the way of our happiness." (52:4)
However, in speeches after the 197 3 war, it appears that
military leaders had become more interested in minimizing
losses. During the 1973 war, General Shazli's concern about
losses was reflected in his discussion of the problems of
crossing the canal. "The third problem was how the engineers
were to carry out these vast engineering operations while
they were under fire from the enemy, who controlled the
east bank. The fourth problem was how the infantry was
to hold out against enemy counter-attacks." (82:1) As
General Ismail said after the war, "I knew what it would
mean if we lost our army." (83:16)
Given a choice between action and inaction,
the military typically believed that some action was
necessary. (69:84) They would act immediately instead of
delaying, e.g., "There is no reason or logic, nor is there
any motivation to delay beginning the struggle now." (76:15)
"If we did not start the fighting, the enemy would." (83:17)
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d. In what circumstances are high-risk policies
mandatory or permissible? In what circumstances are low-
risk policies mandatory or permissible?
The military believes that high-risk policies
are necessary in case of a threat to their territory or
sovereignty. (13:A1) They are also more inclined to take
risks in military situations than when the policy involves
international negotiation. (70:65-71) Their stance on
positive neutrality is an example of a low-risk policy in
international relations.
14. What Is the Best Timing of Action to Advance
One's Interests?
a. How important is timing in achieving long-term
aspirations? How important is timing in the success of
specific policy undertakings?
TABLE 29
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
MAJOR ASPIRATIONS
1 IMPORTANT 12(100 3(50) 5(50) 6(100)
2 NOT IMPORTANT 3(50) 5(50)
POLICY UNDERTAKINGS
1 IMPORTANT 8(100) 4(100) 6(60) 6(100)
2 NOT IMPORTANT 4(40)
There is general agreement along leaders that
timing is important in the pursuit of both major goals and
specific policies. However, the importance of timing lies
127

in the importance of always beginning initiatives immediately
There is a sense of urgency in most of the references to
timing by military leaders, e.g., "We wish to race with
time." (19:B6) "We are approaching crucial and decisive
months in making our decision." (99:4) "We decided to
intervene immediately in case of any aggressive action taken
by Israel against Syria." (69:84) Timing is also seen as
important in battle, although not as important as prepara-
tion. Thus success can be achieved by "exploiting the
element of surprise to a maximum degree, and by shattering
and confusing the enemy command." (87:13)
Those references which indicate that timing was
not important usually stated that outcomes were inevitable
no matter when initiatives were taken. "There shall inevi-
tably be a day when justice and truth will prevail once
mone." (52:1) "We are heading confidently and steadily
toward the realization of the objectives of the Arab nation."
(48:1)
b. Under what circumstances is action required,
permissible, or prohibited?
To the Egyptian military, action is required
to: 1) seize the correct historical moment; 2) in response
to an initiative; 3) during a stalemate.
The first case contained the most references.
The military's belief that they must seize the correct
historical moment is one of the strongest parts of their
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code. "All this (strength of the armed forces) is bound
to increase their effectiveness and ability to perform their
duty upon receiving word that the time has come to move in
defense of the honor and rights and cherished aspirations
of the Arabs." (52:1) "The day has come for the liberation
of Palestine. " (64:1)
Action is also required in response to a situa-
tion. "The armed forces will be at full alert to carry out
their battle assignments on the Israeli front according to
developments in the situation." (69:34) Action is also
required during a stalemate, as noted by the frequent
references to the unacceptability of the no peace, no war
attrition from 1968 to 1970. (83:16)
15. V7hat Is the Utility and Role of Different Means
for Advancing One's Interests?
a. What tactics does the actor use? Which tactics
are most appropriate and least appropriate for achieving
goals?
As mentioned earlier, Egypt over the years
changed from elimination of Israel to recovery of occupied
territory, and then to challenging the Israeli security
there. In addition, Egypt has sought Arab unity through
this period.
In pursuit of Arab unity, Egypt has most often
used the tactic of the summit conference. This tactic
reflects the Arab penchant for arbitration. From the Brioni
conference in 1956 to the Rabat conference in 1974, Egypt
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has frequently called summit meetings in an attempt to
arbitrate disputes and unify the Arab world under the
leadership of Egypt.
As for the varying strategies employed against
her enemies, usually Israel, the Egyptian military philosophy
was summed up by General Amer when he said, "We will use the
language of force to establish peace." (1:2) Within this
context, the best tactic is seen as mobilization of all the
resources of the state to support a massive armed force of
coordinating Air Force, Naval, and ground forces, e.g.,
"Total armed struggle mobilizing all of the resources of
the state." (28:B4) "The UAR possess the biggest striking
force in the Middle East." (51:1) "It is important that the
dissuasive forces should be capable of extending their long
arms to deliver this retaliatory blow anywhere." (51:1)
"It is the massive preparation, the farsighted planning,
the coordination of various branches, and the final mobili-
zation that allowed us to move into the battle together on
land, sea, and air." (89:9) General Ismail emphasized this
need for coordination when he spoke about the reasons for
the 1967 defeat. "There can be no battle without defense
from the air . . . loss of communications control means loss
of the battle." (68:5) Needless to say, the least appro-
priate tactic in this philosophy is the war of attrition
which Egypt engaged in from 1968 to 1970. As General Ismail
said tactfully, "My opinion was that the war of attrition
had served its purpose." (83:16)
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After the 1973 war, this reliance on the use
of force began to change slightly. The military began to
state that "The armed forces stand ready to resume fighting
if peace efforts fail." (97:6) "Political and military
efforts are proceeding along parallel lines." (101 :D1)
A tactic that the military has scorned in all
circumstances has been international interference, e.g.,
"Egypt will never agree to any international organization
whatever it may be called." (13:A5) "The United Nations
cannot force Israel to give up the occupied lands." (81:13)
b. What does the actor consider to be politically
relevant power?
TABLE 30
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 MILITARY ONLY 18(69) 15(78) 4(80) 6(100)
2 OTHER 8(31) 4(22) 1(20)
Obviously, the military feels that the most
politically relevant power is the armed forces. Since the
Egyptian army is the largest in the Middle East and is the
dominant force in Egyptian politics, this is a logical con-
clusion. There are two aspects of this category that are
worth noting. The first is that the philosophy of military
power as the most relevant political force became even
stronger after the army's performance in 197 3. Secondly,
it is interesting to note what other sources of power the
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military considers relevant. A review of the material indi-
cates that Arab unity has been a dominant theme throughout.
In the early years of the regime Egypt's geographic posi-
tion put it strategically between Africa and the Middle East,
and supposedly allowed it domination of the eastern Mediter-
ranean. However, there have been few references to this in
recent years. A consistent theme, and the most dominant
throughout the period of analysis, has been that confidence
and the will of the people are relevant sources of power.
As Colonel Sadat stated, "True power is the conviction which
stirs a people to struggle for their right to live in
freedom." (16:A16) Major Salem, Minister of National
Guidance, said, "Japan had been a weak country, but once
she had begun to have confidence in herself she became a
great power in less than 50 years." (4:1)
c. What resources does the actor consider available
or not available to further political ends?
The resources that the Egyptians feel will
further their political ends the most are:
1. Socialism.
2. Modern arms from the superpowers.
3. Manpower. "It only befits us, as an Arab nation whose
population is 110 million people and whose annual national
income is more than 26 million dollars, to accept the
Israeli challenge." (81:12)
Socialism and the social system have been mentioned
often as a resource. However, the second two items are the
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most important in terms of a trend. Until General Sadiq
was dismissed in 1972 the emphasis was on weapons. Indeed,
part of the reason for Israel's miscalculations of 1973 was
that Israeli intelligence did not believe that Egypt would
attack without overwhelming weapons superiority. However,
after General Ismail took command a new philosophy developed
General Ismail began to preach that the man, not the weapon,
was the most important factor. After the war he stated,
"The strength of a weapon depends on the man who holds it."
(83:17) This feeling that training and the individual
soldier are important is still prevalent today.
On the other side of the ledger, the resource
that the military feels is most lacking is an Arab arms
industry. General Shazli stated in October 1973, "Arab
military production did not exceed 100 million dollars
annually against 427 million dollars worth of Israeli
military production every year." (81:12) In 1974 General
Ismail was still lamenting the fact that "we are not an
arms producing state." (93:6)
d. What is the source of knowledge for the actor's
instrumental beliefs?
TABLE 31
1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
1 THEORY 22(43) 17(42) 13(42) 23(57)
2 TRENDS 2(3) 3(8)




1955-61 1961-67 1967-73 1973-75
4 HISTORY 7(15) 3(8)
5 SPECIFIC EVENT 9(18) 10(25) 5(16) 14(35)
6 FAITH 3(6) 5(16)
The first aspect of this category to note is
that theory has been the chief source of knowledge for
instrumental beliefs throughout the period of analysis.
This is as opposed to the chief source of knowledge for the
philosophical beliefs, which was specific event interpre-
tation. Examples of these theories are the Egyptian con-
cepts of general mobilization (74:55), economic planning
(19:B5), and the theory that all goals must be accomplished
in the shortest possible time. (36:B28) The comparison
of the sources of knowledge for the two different belief
systems seems to support the contention that the Egyptian
military still maintains definite theories on the conduct
of war and state planning, but seems to adopt its political
philosophy from specific events as each occurs.
The second important aspect of this category is
that specific event interpretation is the second most impor-
tant source of knowledge. The specific events which shape
the military's instrumental beliefs are, of course, the
1967 and 1973 wars. This also seems to support the contention






Pla. What is The Eseential Nature of The Political
Universe?
The military sees the political universe in a state
of perpetual conflict, regardless of the individual successes
or failures. They view this conflict as zero-sum in the
case of Israel or any other enemy. However, in the area
of super-power relations there have been indications of
a non-zero-sum philosophy in recent years. They tend to
view the basic source of a conflict as an individual state's
expansionist desires as opposed to defects in the inter-
national system itself. In recent years the state has been
Israel backed by the U.S. However, they view conflict as
a necessary part of historical development and in the case
of military tactics they see conflict as indispensable.
They tend to look for linkages between issues and in most
cases will view a conflictual situation as a link in the
continuing struggle. If they cannot establish a linkage
between issues they will look for a spillover from one
issue to the next.
Plb. What is The Fundamental Character of Ones Political
Opponents and of Other Significant Political Actors?
The Egyptian military seems to be somewhat vague
in its assessment of the opponent and his methods for
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achieving goals. The military sees Israel as it sees
itself. Israel is thought to be interested in expanding
its borders to achieve security, a basically defensive
orientation. Israel is also seen as being driven by
internal needs such as security and economic stability.
Russia and the United States are perceived in the same
manner.
The military sees conflict as permanent and encom-
passing all issues. Only recently has there been an indi-
cation that problems can be separated from each other and
that the specific resolution of Israel's security needs
might lead to peace. However, the military also still
strongly believes that any conciliation will be ignored and
taken advantage of, and that a show of force will make any
enemy back down. They also feel that their opponents, and
to some extent the United States and Russia, see conflict
as inevitable and desirable. They feel that most opponents
will try to optimize objectives instead of being satisfied
with short term results. They also feel that the opponent
is predictable, but unrealistic and inflexible. They feel
that Israel uses a blitzkrieg or all out effort to achieve
goals, but that the United States and Russia employ more of
a piecemeal or incremental approach. In addition, since 1973
the military has begun to believe that Israel is more
interested in minimizing losses than in maximizing gains.
Since 1973 there have been few references to how
the military feels that opponents regard Egypt. When they
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do comment, the military feels that opponents see Egypt
as weak and backward.
One of the most important parts of the question
is the fact that, since 1973, there have been many indica-
tions that the military sees the opponent's nation as con-
sisting of a group of competing elements, some of whom
can be dealt with.
Pic. What is The Nature of The Contemporary International
System?
The Egyptian military sees the world as definitely
polar. Usually they see the international system as bipolar
with Russia and the U.S. the centers of each pole. Even
when they speak about Russia and the U.S. cooperating in a
Middle East solution, it is from the standpoint of cooperation
between poles.
P2 . What Are The Prospects For The Eventual Realization
of One's Fundamental Political Values and Aspirations?
The military sees itself as it sees it enemies.
That is, they see themselves as motivated by defensive
goals, usually security and maintenance of the status quo.
However, the opponent might have to be destroyed to attain
these goals. The military is generally optimistic about long
term goals like the "final victory", but tends to be pessi-
mistic about short term goals. Optimism or pessimism is
usually contingent on some specific event such as third
world unity, a strong army, Soviet aid, etc. Time is
considered to be on the side of the Egyptians.
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P3. Is The Political Future Predictable? In What
Sense and to What Extent? What is The Role of Chance in
Human Affairs?
The military believes that the political future is
predictable, but only because it has faith in the use of
force. Political processes are seen as much less predic-
table. The most predictable part of life is historical
development and the certainty of final victory.
P4 . How Much Control or Mastery Can One Have Over
Historical Development?
In almost all cases the military feels that the
leader should actively try to control events and that the
leader can have an effect on both government planning and
international politics.
In formulating its philosophical beliefs the mili-
tary most often forms a general theory from its interpre-
tation of some specific event like a war. Second in impor-
tance is the use of historical parallels. Ideology such
as the philosophy of Nasir or readings from the Koran are
used very little.
B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
II. What is The Best Approach For Selecting Goals or
Objectives of Political Action?
The military feels that the best approach to
achieving goals is to formulate each objective within a
framework of an overall master plan. The goals themselves
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should be more feasible than optimal. In other words,
challenge the Israeli security theory rather than destroy
her. Since 1973 there has also been an awareness that
tradeoffs might be necessary because some goals, such as
protection of the army as a political force and destruction
of Israel, are incompatible.
12. How Are The Goals Of Action Pursued Most Effectively?
The best way to pursue a goal is to prepare care-
fully and then go ahead. Few military leaders advocate an
incremental approach of intermediate, short term goals.
Once established, a goal cannot be modified or substituted
for unless it is scaled up. The only exception is a case
in which the entire army is in danger of extinction. In
addition the best strategy to achieve goals is to push
harder if progress is slow instead of pull back.
13. How Are The Risks of Political Action Calculated,
Controlled, and Accepted?
The risks of political action are assessed in terms
of the overall goal, rather than in terms of a specific
tactic. The question is not whether the bombing raid will
be a success or not, but what effect the bombing raid will
have on the achievement of final victory. Given the choice
between maximizing gains and minimizing losses, the Egyptian
military will opt for minimizing losses. The military will
take action over inaction, and will act immediately rather
than delay. They will also take more risks in military
action than in political action.
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14. What is The Best Timing of Action to Advance
One's Interests?
Timing is extremely important in achieving goals.
It is usually important to act as soon as possible. Action
is required to: 1) seize the correct historical moment;
2) in response to an initiative; 3) during a stalemate.
15. What is The Utility and Role of Different Means
For Advancing One's Interests?
The military feels that the best tactic is usually
force, and the best use of force is a massive, coordinated
attack by air, naval, and ground forces backed by the full
mobilization of the state. That is, an attack in the Russian
manner. The least appropriate tactic with enemies is the
type of war of attrition used from 1968 to 1970. However,
the best tactic to use among other Arabs is the summit con-
ference, with Egypt in the lead. Needless to say, the most
politically relevant power is the army. Among the resources
that the military values most is manpower, or the individual
soldier. This is as opposed to ultra-modern weapons. Other
resources that are politically relevant are the confidence
and will of the people. The resource that is most lacking
is an Arab arms industry.
The source of knowledge for instrumental beliefs
are general theories such as mobilization, economic planning,
etc. , as opposed to specific event interpretation for the
philosophical beliefs. However, specific event interpretation
140

is the second most important source for instrumental
beliefs. In other words, the general theories of politics
that the Egyptian military has always maintained act as





In using the operational code it is important to remem-
ber that the code defines the actor's perception of a problem
and his approach to problem solving that has evolved from
his political experience. It is, therefore, vital in dis-
covering how a political leader will react to a situation.
However, the operational code is only one of the factors
involved in a decision. History never totally repeats
itself and there are always unique factors which will in-
fluence a decision. In addition, a political leader many
times operates in an environment of partial knowledge.
However, in moments of crisis the actor will rely more and
more on the lessons he has learned previously and on his
general philosophical and instrumental beliefs, i.e., his
operational code. With this caveat in mind several predic-
tions can be made concerning the military's attitudes
towards current problems by use of the operational code
and historical background.
1. With the continuing emphasis on the individual as
Egypt's chief resource, training will continue to play a
major role in the planning of the armed forces. Egypt will
continue to develop its own facilities for this purpose.
2. On the question of arms diversification the military
will be scenario oriented. If the military does not perceive
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an immediate threat to its existence, it will go along with
President Sadat's efforts to diversify weapons. The mili-
tary is not satisfied with the performance of either Russian
advisors or weapons. However, the military feels that any
single alliance with either superpower is domination. A
gain for either the U.S. or Russia in Egypt is a loss for
the military because of their zero-sum philosophy. It
should be kept in mind that the military sees the inter-
national system as one of continuing conflict and will
interpret most situations as a crisis. If the military
perceives a threat to its position within Egyptian society,
it will pursue whatever course is necessary to maintain
itself.
3. It is always possible that the military might push
for resumption of the war. Their operational code indicates
that they feel that it is necessary to take action when
presented with an initiative by the enemy. They also feel
that it is necessary to seize the correct historical moment
to initiate an action. It is against their nature to let
that correct moment pass. Also remember that their chief
source of knowledge for their philosophical beliefs is
interpretation of past events, and they have interpreted
the 1973 war as a victory for Egyptian arms. They also
believe that a show of force will make an enemy back down.
This was one of the reasons for their maneuvering prior
to the 1967 war.
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4. If the military were to decide to attack again it
would be an all out effort, but for limited goals. The
military will not jeopardize its existence. The goal of an
attack will probably be to challenge the theory that Israeli
occupation of the Sinai provides it with defensible boundaries
5. The one resource which the Egyptians feel that they
need the most is an indigenous arms industry. They will
continue to try to develop one.
Another set of predictions can be made about the
behavior of military elites by using the operational code.
One of the objects of this research was to explore the
changes in the operational code over the years. The research
indicates that there were unique aspects of the military's
operational code which gave it the impetus to push for war
at all costs after 1967. Should these aspects of the code
ever occur again it will be an indication that the military
is once again beginning to feel that war is the only answer.
The following indicators will be present if the military's
operational code reverts to the 1967-73 period.
1. If the conflict with Israel is linked to overall
world peace and the military indicates that resolution of
this conflict immediately is the only answer to attaining
the "final victory."
2. Return to an overwhelming belief that a firm stand




3. Continued statements that the world sees Egypt as
weak and backward and that Egypt's honor is at stake.
4. Return to a strong model I attitude. That is, a
feeling that Israel is a monolithic unit and that there
are no competing groups within Israeli politics who might
listen to reason.
5. Return to a destructionist attitude.
6. Return to the belief that time is on the side of the
opponent.
7. Reappearance of an optimal instead of satisficing
strategy.
8. Return to the philosophy that there is only one
correct path instead of multiple paths to the achievement
of goals.
9. Return to maximizing goals instead of minimizing
losses as the best way to cope with risk.
B. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The operational code has proven to be an excellent
vehicle for assessing a political leader or group of leaders'
approach to decision making and problem solving. Egyptian
military elites agreed to a large extent in their operational
code and the code was consistent over time. The results
of the code agreed with the trends in the history of the
Egyptian military. The code is especially effective for
military and political analysis because it uncovers those
aspects of decision making which are most important in
formulating military and political strategy.
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There are two criticisms of the results of the code
which seem to be valid. The first is that the code was
constructed from public statements. Although there is an
advantage in this method in that the actor's public state-
ments are easily available and his code can be monitored
by most analysts, there is no method for comparing public
statements with private statements. Although analysis over
time aids in eliminating this problem, further research is
needed to compare Egyptian military elite private and public
statements. Further research is also needed on other elite
groups in the Middle East so that operational codes can be
compared. Only then will it be possible to establish whether
the operational code construct can distinguish between indi-
viduals or between groups. The only group that the code
can be compared to at this time is that of the Politburo.
A comparison here indicated many differences. The Politburo
engaged in intelligent, well calaculated, and pragmatic
decision making. The Egyptian military acts on lessons
learned and in accordance with the correct historical moment.
The Bolsheviks felt that one should not set goals that are
feasible, but the Egyptian military since 1973 has begun to
adopt this philosophy. There are enough differences in
philosophies that a good distinction can be made. However,
the test will come in comparing contemporary Middle East
groups.
A second set of problems involves construction of the
code. As noted in the text, in assessing the military's
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philosophy concerning risk taking, the author decided that
several statements were more important than others in con-
structing this part of the code. If the code of the Egyptian
elite is a good indicator, subjective judgements by the
analyst will always be necessary in constructing an opera-
tional code. Therefore, there will be problems in a true
quantification of an operational code. The second problem
in this area is evident in the reliability test. One
statement was selected for analysis because, in the opinion
of the author, the statement contained no relevant data
for constructing the code. The object of this part of the
exercise was to determine if the ten encoders would have a
tendency to make inferential leaps about the content of the
material. This is one of the most common problems in con-
structing an accurate operational code. The results show
that a majority of the encoders assigned a belief category
to this statement. The answers were skewed in several
directions. This indicates that considerable training will
be necessary if an extremely large group of encoders were
used in covering a large body of material. It also indi-
cates that the operational code may best be constructed by
a few analysts who are extremely familiar with the methodology
In any event, further research is needed to construct a
good reliability test that can be universally applied and
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The following test was given to ten encoders from the
Naval Postgraduate School as described in Section III.
The following results were achieved:
1. Intercoder reliability. Overall average reliability
of 67.5%.
Question A. B. C. D.
80% 50% 50% 60%
2. Comparison of encoder results with the results of
the author.
Question A. B. C. D.
80% 50% 60%
Note that in Question B. none of the encoders agreed
with the author. This question was inserted because it
did not have any data relevant to the code. The question
was whether a group of encoders not extremely familiar with
the material or the operational code methodology would tend
to make assumptions about the answers to the questions.
Apparently they would, regardless of their familiarity or
lack of familiarity with the subject. The fact that the
author in this case was more conservative than the encoders
in collecting data should add validity to this code.
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This exercise is intended to explore a political actor's
operational code belief system. The code includes beliefs
concerning the political universe, one's fundamental goals,
the best strategy for achieving these goals, and a concep-
tion of what the opponent's goals are. Please read each
passage and then select the best answer to the question
which follows. Place an x next to the appropriate response.
Do not infer anything. If there is no specific sentence or
phrase in the passage which indicates the actor's belief,
mark no reference. Disregard prior opinions about the
countries involved.
A. In these decisive days in the history of humanity, in
these days when justice struggles to defend its existence
in the face of the falsehoods, aggression, evil, international
chaos, domination, tyranny and imperialism, in these days
Egypt, your homeland, stands firm in safeguarding its
sovereignty.
What is the nature of the political universe?
1. Conflictual (x) The author states that conflict is
the normal state of relations.
2. Mixed ( ) There is reference to both conflictual and
consensual aspects of the international system.
3. Harmonious ( ) The actor regards the political
universe as one with many shared interests among individuals,
nations, etc.
4. No reference ( )
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B. I particularly single out the imperialist base threatening
peace. Israel's policy is built on aggression. Israel
obtains modern arms to gain armament supremacy.
What are the opponent's goals?
1. Destructionist ( ) The opponent is believed to have
virtually unlimited goals; such as universal hegemony,
destruction or radical transformation of the international
system.
2. Expansionist ( ) The opponent is regarded as aggressive,
but his goals fall short of total destruction.
3. Defensive ( ) The opponent is believed to be primarily
concerned with his own security or maintenance of some
status quo.
4. Conciliatory ( ) The opponent is vewed as ready and
willing to undertake at least limited accommodation.
5. No reference (x)
C. As for coordination, it is 100% coordination on the
military level and 100% coordination at the political
level. As military men we have a clear objective, namely
liberating our lands and giving the Palestinian people
their legitimate rights. We are training and working
sincerely to achieve this objective with our military
means.
What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?




2. Expansionist ( ) Although the actor is active in the
pursuit of interests, his goals fall short of total destruc-
tion, and do not include transformation of the international
system.
3. Defensive (x) The actor is primarily concerned with
security and maintenance of the status quo. His quest for
security may infringe on another's sovereignty and could
even lead to destroying part of the opponent's nation.
His concept of the status quo may also be open to question.
However, he sees himself as primarily concerned with security
instead of hegemony or territorial expansion.
4. Conciliatory ( ) The actor desires at least limited
accommodation
.
5. Active seeker of peace ( ) The actor desires to
undertake major initiatives for peace.
6. No reference ( )
D. The next war will not be a war restricted only to military
operations, it will be a total war — either survival or
extinction of the entire state and all its sectors. As to
when we decide to enter the battle with the enemy, we must
be fully aware that the state has taken into account the
moment that we will enter the battle with all our might,
our capacities, and our human and material resources in
every section of the state by means of complete general
mobilization to serve the war effort.
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What are the approaches to the pursuit of goals?
1. Prepare ground ( ) The actor believes that the best
way to pursue goals is to make very careful prior preparations
2. Try and see ( ) The actor takes action as a way of
testing what is feasible and what is not. It is not necessary
or feasible to determine what the outcome will be.
3. Incremental ( ) The actor emphasizes the value of
limited gains.
4. Blitzkrieg strategy (x) The actor believes that the
most effective strategy involves committing a major portion
of one's resources and a full scale effort to deal with
the problem.
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